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I.

INTRODUCTION

In February, 1978, President Carter's executive reorganization plan transferred enforcement of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) from the Labor Department WageHour Division to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.' In April, 1978, Congress enacted major amendments to the
ADEA raising the mandatory retirement age for non-federal
workers to seventy and abolishing mandatory retirement for
nearly all federal workers.' The 1978 ADEA amendments altered
the retirement programs of more than 50,000,000 American workers. It also restructured payment and collection of social security
benefits and of retirement and profit sharing plan payments. By
the amendments, Congress has attempted to reverse a long term
historical trend toward early retirement and an increasing dependency ratio by providing guaranteed employment to age seventy for workers in private enterprise.
The 1978 ADEA amendments failed to solve many of the
difficult technical problems involved in private suit enforcement
of ADEA. The amendments attempted to overrule the United
States Supreme Court's decision in United Airlines, Inc. v.
McMann,3 which insulated forced retirement under pre-1967 pension plans at company option before age sixty-five from ADEA
sanctions. It is doubtful, however, whether Congress succeeded in
overriding the Supreme Court. Congress also failed to correct
many other technical problems disclosed in the ten-year life of
the ADEA. This article will explore the sociology behind the original ADEA, the structure of the 1967 ADEA, its weaknesses and
* Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England School of Law. Part III of this
article previously appeared, substantially as printed, in 4 Ofo N. L. REv. 748, 750-58
(1977).
1. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (1978).
2. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 624, 633a (West Supp. 1978).
3. 434 U.S. 192 (1977). The Louisiana Legislature used the infamous "grandfather
clause" to deny the right to vote. Every person whose grandfather had not voted in the
1860 general election had to pass an impossible literacy test. McMann revives this ghost
and hides it in the "impairment of contract" doctrine.
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strengths during its ten-year life, and the effectiveness of the 1978
amendments in dealing with the problems inherent in the original
Act.
II.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT IN AMERICA

A.

History of Age Discrimination

One of the mixed blessings of our culture is the expanding
life expectancy of each generation since the Civil War. In 1850,
when the average male life span was estimated to be 40 years,'
the problems created by modem trends toward longevity did not
exist. By the 1960's, however, the United States had undergone
a revolution in the make-up of its adult population. This revolution resulted, in large part, from this country's great social commitment in the last quarter of the nineteenth century to better
health, better nutrition, and the development of preventive medicine. The immediate result of this campaign was a sharp decline
in infant mortality, which made it possible for more persons to
survive into adulthood and old age. 5 in 1900, 48 out of every 100
children born could expect to live to 60. In 1950, 76 out of 100
children born could count on living to 60.6 According to the Bureau of the Census, the natural increase in population between
1900 and 1960 accounted for only half the increase in the number
of persons over 60 between 1900 and 1960.1 Between 1880 and
1910, 18 million people immigrated to the United States,8 mostly
healthy young adults. This figure accounts for about 20% of the
increase in older Americans between 1900 and 1960.' The remaining component, attributable to declining infant and maternal
mortality rates, increased life expectancy, and better medical
care for older Americans, accounts for three-tenths of the increase
in older Americans.10
Since 1900, American industry, responding to trade union
pressure, has recognized an employee's right to retire, generally
at age 65. Since World War II, many employers have adopted
retirement nnqion programs which offer small retirement stipends to long service employees. An adjunct feature of many of
4. See WHrr HousE CONFERENCE ON AGING, AGING IN THE STATEs-A REPORT OF PROGRESS, CONCERNS, AND GOALS 24 (1961) [hereinafter cited as AGING IN THE STATES].
5. Id. at 23.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 24.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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these programs is an "early retirement program" by which an
employer can force a worker into retirement before 65, at the
whim of the employer. One side effect of this type of retirement
program is an increasing dependency ratio. At the turn of the
century, 94 nonworkers depended upon every 100 workers. Most
of these dependents were children." In 1950, after a substantial
decline in the birth rate during the 1920's and 1930's, the dependency ratio was 74 per 100. By 1960, the ratio had increased to 89
per 100, reflecting both the postwar baby boom and an increasing
number of unemployed persons over 50.12
During the same period, an average American's life span has
increased while his work-life expectancy has declined. In 1900, a
20-year old worker had an average life expectancy of 42.2 years
and a work-life expectancy of 39.4 years. In 1960, a 20-year old
worker had a 49.6 year life expectancy, but his work-life had
expanded only 3.2 years to 42.6 years. His retirement, therefore,
expanded from 2.8 years in 1900 to 7.0 years in 1960.1 In 1970,
there were 19,799,000 men and women over 65 in the United
States." 8,393,000 were males; 11,406,000 were females. 5 A generation earlier, in 1930, there were 6,644,000 men and women over
65, 3,333,000 males and 3,311,000 females." In 1968, 837 out of
every 1,000 persons over 65 received social security benefits." In
1970, 16.4% of all persons over 65 were employed. 83.0% were not
in the work force. Persons not in the work force included 8,534,000
who said they were keeping house, 5,316,000 who were retired,
1,546,000 who were in bad health, and 97,000 who were unable to
obtain work. 8 It is therefore clear that work is not a significant
factor in the support scheme or lifestyle of Americans over 65.
Only 0.5% of all Americans over 65 were unemployed and seeking
jobs.
This pattern is reflected in a lowering of the normal retirement age statistically. Although the American labor force increased 35% between 1930 and 1960, the increase was not spread
uniformly throughout all occupational classifications. The number of public officials, lawyers, and accountants increased. Bakers, blacksmiths, boilermakers, carpenters, masons, painters,
11. Id. at 25.
12. Id.
13. YUNG-PIN CHEN, INCOME-BACKGROUND 55, table 5 (1971 White House Conference

on Aging Monograph).
14. Id. at 54, table 3 (figures based on projections by U.S. Board of Census).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 73, table 29.
18. Id. at 79, table 36.
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plasterers, seamstresses, laundry and dry cleaning workers, coal
miners, and typesetters decreased in number. Totally new occupations associated with communications, computer technology,
and aerospace technology have risen since 1930. One striking result of this uneven increase in occupational fields is the impact
on older men and women in the work force. American males over
55 were proportionally underrepresented in the new occupations
of the 1950's and 1960's."9 This was counterbalanced by the overrepresentation of males 55 or older in such occupations as farming, real estate sales, locomotive engineers, tailors and furriers,
guards and watchmen, and shoemaking.2 0 The implication which
may be drawn from this phenomenon is clear: industry is not
interested in investing time and money in retraining older workers for jobs created by changing technology, nor are younger workers likely to accept jobs in trades or skills that are obsolescent.
Thus, the impact of obsolescence falls more heavily on the shoulders of older workers. 21 During the 1960's, the rate of egress from
the work force by workers over 55 more than compensated for the
1
22 This trend has continued
reduction in unemployment generally
throughout the 1970's, and may have been accelerated by the
recessions of 1970-71 and 1975-77. When older workers who are
willing to work are laid off, they are out of work for much longer
periods than workers under 45. 23 The percent and relative number
of American workers over 45 has been declining since 1950. This
phenomenon has not been offset by retirement programs, by social security benefits, or by a meaningful alternative to employment for men over 45 who are dismissed from the work force
19. I. SOBEL, EMPLOYMENT-BACKGROUND 9 (1971 White House Conference on Aging
Monograph).
20. See id. at 10-13, tables 3, 4, & 5 for a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon.
Employers literally force agism on older workers by preferring younger workers who will
produce for a longer period of time after retraining for new occupations. Thus, passive
agism results from a "phase-out" of obsolete technological training which inevitably resuits in a disproportionate number of layoffs and discharges, or forced early retirements
that directly affect workers over 55.
21. Dr. Sobel states:
These data, in regard to rates of unemployment by age, represent the ieast
important aspect of the problem. Such information can be likened to the relatively small, visible part of the employment iceberg. The real problem is that
many older workers after displacement, and after long quests for employment,
tend to stop looking for work and are thus subsequently classified as out of the
laborforce rather than unemployed. Thus, involuntary retirement at ages from
55 upward may present one growing and highly undesirable facet of manpower
utilization.
Id. at 12. See also id. at 15-16, tables 6 & 7.
22. Id. at 9.
23. Id. at 18, table 8.
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before "normal retirement" at 65. This condition, which was recognized as early as 1951,24 is the phenomenon of age discrimination in employment.
B.

1950 Conference on Aging: Recommendations for Legislation

The First National Conference on Aging, initiated by President Truman in 1950, produced a pioneer study on the impact of
aging on the American work force. The study, called Man and His
Years, An Account of the First National Conference on Aging,2"
concluded, among other things, that a trend for early retirement
for workers aged 55-65 had appeared as early as 1940,26 and persisted into 1950.2 The study cited both voluntary and involuntary factors contributing to this decline. The voluntary factors
included increased per capita income, higher savings, old age
and survivors insurance benefits, pension programs, and charitable relief for poor persons. 2 The involuntary factors cited were
changing production technology, physical ability, increasing job
eligibility standards, and a decline in demand for certain jobs
populated by older workers.29 Man and His Years tentatively
concluded that this decline was probably the product of involuntary factors, rather than a voluntary shift to earlier dates for
opting out of the work force.30
Man and His Years also cited the retirement policy of companies as a major reason for quitting the work force." In 1950, compulsory retirement generally occurred at 65. Man and His Years
contained an extensive discussion of compulsory retirement practices, 32 concluding that raising the compulsory retirement age, or
24. FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, MAN AND His YEARS-AN ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AGING 83 (1950) [hereinafter cited as MAN AND His YEASl.

25. Id. This work was the first comprehensive study of the social problems of aging
in America conducted by an agency of the United States. The seminal study on the impact
of aging on the economy and upon the lifestyle of older Americans is A. EPSTEIN, THE
CHALLENGE OF THE AGED (1928).
26. MAN AND His YEARS, supra note 24, at 25.
27. Id. at 25-26.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 27-28.
31. Id. at 74-77. The industry participants in the 1950 conference were quick to point
out the political advantages of forced retirement which opens up opportunities of promotion for younger people in the plant.
32. Id. at 76-78. The best analysis of compulsory retirement in the fifties is contained,
however, in J. CORSON & J. MCCONNELL, ECONOMIC NEEDS OF OLDER PEOPLE 73-86 (1956).
The study was commissioned by the Twentieth Century Fund under a special committee
chaired by Arthur H. Dean. Compulsory retirement was found to be arbitrary and socially
unacceptable, even if confined to persons 65 or older.
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doing away with compulsory retirement altogether, would not
significantly raise productivity in business or industry.
The 1950 Conference on Aging listed seven factors that restricted employment of older workers:
(1) Physical standards that are unnecessarily rigid;
(2) Inadequatejob analysis and specifications;
(3) Failure to engineerjobs in terms of labor supply as well as
in terms of the capacities of older workers;
(4) Inadequateplacement and assignment;
(5) Considerationof workers on the basis of chronologicalage
rather than in terms of their physiological age and individual
abilities;
(6) Widespread belief that workmen's compensation, group
insuranceand pension plans are more costly when older workers
are hired; and
(7) General prejudice against older workers.Y
The 1950 Conference on Aging came to no conclusion about the
wisdom of legislation outlawing age discrimination in private
employment. Instead, it recommended that age limits in civil
service jobs be removed."4 It would be eleven years before a responsible body called for anti-age discrimination legislation.
C.

The 1961 White House Conference on Aging

President Kennedy convened the Second National Conference on Aging at the White House in 1961. Following the 1950
Conference, some states had adopted anti-age discrimination legislation.3 In 1948, New York had established a Joint Legislative
Committee on Problems of Aging which made its report after the
1950 Conference. Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, and Michigan established institutes for gerontology.36 Temple University held a
series of conferences on the problems of making a living while
growing old. The University of California and the University of
Wisconsin had statistically analyzed retirement programs and
their impact on older workers. The 1959 California studies showed
007o 01
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AND His YEARS, supra note 24, at 84.
34. Id. at 85.
35. The following jurisdictions had anti-age discrimination legislation prior to 1961:
Alaska, 1960; Colorado, 1903; Connecticut, 1959; Delaware, 1960; Louisiana, 1934; Massachusetts, 1937 and 1950; New York, 1958; Oregon, 1959; Pennsylvania, 1956; Puerto Rico,
1959; Rhode Island, 1956; Wisconsin, 1959. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN
WORKER-AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 107 (1965) [hereinafter cited as THE OLDER

33. MAN

AMERICAN WORKER].
36. AGING IN THE STATES,

supra note 4, at 57.
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unemployed were over 45. The United States Labor Department
also produced studies, showing that the productivity and output
and equal or better in qualof older workers was more consistent
37
ity to that of younger workers.
Special counseling and placement programs for older workers
also appeared during the 1950's. Louisiana tried to obtain employers' voluntary consent to elimination of age restrictions on job
applications and employment advertising.3 The Federal Office of
Vocational Rehabilitation started training programs for older
workers to provide them with marketable skills." In spite of these
positive steps by the states, the 1961 conference was thematically
pessimistic.
The delegates to the 1961 conference characterized the problem of the older worker by two statements. First, older workers
were widely discriminated against in obtaining work. Second,
older workers unable to work to normal retirement at 65 suffered
a corresponding loss in retirement income security. 0 The 1961
Conference on Aging did not adopt or recommend a model act
outlawing age discrimination in hiring and retention. Instead, it
listed its policy recommendations in summary fashion:
1. It is recognized that pertinent studies show that chronological age by itself is not a reliable measure of ability to do the job.
There is, therefore, need for an educational and information
program that will correct widespread but false impressions of
employers and hiring personnel concerning older workers, and
impress them with the facts about their abilities.
2. It is recommended that the President be authorized by Congress to appoint a Committee on Employment of Older Workers,
with appropriate staff and funds, to spearhead and direct on a
voluntary basis, a nationwide program at national, state, and
community levels, to educate employers, labor and other groups
concerning the qualification of middle-aged and older workers,
and to promote policies of hiring on the basis of qualified [sic]
and without regard to age.
3. It is recommended that the State legislate to prevent discrimination in hiring on the basis of age .... 1
President Kennedy did not act upon the 1961 conference recommendations. Congress, however, added to Title VII of the Civil
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 57-58.
Id.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 32-33.

41. STAFF OF SPECIAL SENATE COMM. ON AGING, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESs., THE 1961 WHITE
POLICY STATEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 35
(Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 RECOMMENDATIONS].
HOUSE CONFERENCE ON AGING-BASIC
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Rights Act of 1964, section 715,42 which required the Secretary of
Labor to investigate the problem of age discrimination in American labor. The Labor Department responded within a year.
D.

The Older American Worker

In 1965, the Labor Department issued its section 715 report,
commonly called The OlderAmerican Worker.43 It had two parts.
The first part was a series of surveys by the Labor Department
of age discrimination in employment practices in key metropolitan areas. The second part, which appears first in the printed
report, recommended a federal anti-age discrimination act. The
data discovered by the Labor Department reinforced the 1950 and
1961 Conferences on Aging. The Older American Worker demanded federal anti-age discrimination legislation.
1. The Labor Department Metropolitan Area Survey. The
Labor Department chose five metropolitan areas in the United
States to see to what extent age discrimination in hiring adversely
affected workers between 45 and 64. None of the five was located
in a state having an anti-age discrimination act." The survey also
attempted to discover, whether employer retention and promotion
practices discriminated against workers 45 to 64.11
a. The Hiring Policy Survey. In March, 1965, the Labor
Department found that 8.6% of all new hirings in the five areas
were of workerb over 45. Workers over 45 constituted 27% of the
unemployed population of the five areas." One out of six employers had an open hiring policy with respect to age limits. The
remainder set age restrictions on all job applicants." New hires
for workers 40-44 was at the level of national unemployment, or
about 7.6%. New hires for workers 45-54, however, were less than
half the national unemployment rate, and those between 55 and
64 were hired at one-fifth the national unemployment level.4 8
42. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 265 (prior to 1972
amendment).
43. The speed with which the Labor Department prepared THE OLDER AMERICAN
WORKER, supra note 35, illustrates what government can do if someone ights a fire under
a federal agency. The impetus in this case was President Johnson's personal concern for
the problem of age discrimination.
44. Id. pt. I, at 3. The following states enacted age discrimination legislation between
1961 and 1965: California, 1961; Hawaii, 1964; Idaho, 1965; Indiana, 1965; Nebraska, 1963;
New Jersey, 1962; North Dakota, 1965; Ohio, 1961; Washington, 1961. Id. at 107.
45. Id. at 3.
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id. at 3. This sample consisted of 540 employers. Four hundred fifty-four of these
employers, representing 71% of aggregate employment, furnished data on 89,000 new
workers hired during 1964. Id. at 4.
48. Id. at 4.
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Older women were accepted more readily than older men.4"
One hundred forty-eight employers reported having a fixed
upper age limit for employment; 303 stated they had no upper
limit. A small group of employers reported an affirmative action
program for the hiring and retention of older workers. Employers
with stated age discrimination policies reduced hirings of workers
over 45 to 6.9% of all hires, compared to 13.0% in the affirmative
action group. 50 The main reasons employers gave for age discrimination in hiring were physical deterioration in workers, desire to
promote workers from within, fear that older workers would ask
for more pay than the job called for, and adverse impact on company pension plan funding. 51 The Labor Department concluded
that a significant number of American employers engaged in age
discrimination in hiring."
b. The Retention and Promotion Survey. The Labor Department survey also noted a strong trend toward voluntary retirement before the commonly accepted age of 65 had begun in
the middle 1950's and continued through the survey date of 196465.11 The Social Security Administration reported that in 1963,
62% of all retirees at 65 or over did so voluntarily, whereas only
5
59% of retirees between 62 and 64 were voluntary. Workers
retired before reaching 65 tended to hold low-paying jobs with
intermitent employment records prior to retirement.55
The surveyed employers suggested that older workers were
more of a liability than an asset because of physical infirmity and
mental slowness. The Labor Department compiled materials
from several sources to ascertain whether there was any scientific
evidence for these employer opinions. After review, the Department concluded:
(a) Deterioration in muscle control and ability to coordinate
hand and eye motion is not affected by change in the central
nervous system at all before 60. After 60 no generalization can
49. Id. at 5-6.
50. Id.at 7.
51. Id. at 10-13.

52. Id. at 16-17.
53. Id. at 71.
54. Id. at 74.
55. Id. The Labor Department recommended employers review gradual or phased
retirement policies for the benefit of older workers. Id. at 76-77.
56. E.g., A. WELFORD, AGING AND HUMAN SKILLS (1958); Birren, Age Changes in Skill

and Learning, in EARNING OPPORTUNITIES FOR OLDER WORKERS (1955); McFarland &
O'Doherty, Work and Occupational Skills, in HANDBOOK OV AGING IN THE INDIVIDUAL
(1959).
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be made for deteriorating coordination, since individual performance varies widely. 57
(b) Although older workers tend to have less formal education
than younger workers, and to require somewhat longer time to
digest and understand new materials, there is no evidence indicating workers over 45 cannot be satisfactorily retrained for new
occupational skills."
(c) Outside of those jobs which demand heavy physical labor,
older workers performed as well or better than younger workers
up to normal retirement age. Further, individual performance
varied among older workers such that no conclusion could be
drawn relating to over-all declining performance after 60 or even
65.59
(d) Older workers were more likely to enjoy their work, to be
absent less often and have fewer industrial accidents than
younger workers °
The Labor Department concluded, therefore, that employers' intuitive judgments about decreasing performances had no rational
justification.
,
c. Economic Consequences of Age Discriminati,. Fin
the Labor Department examined the economic results of age discrimination in hiring and retention. Unemployment among white
and nonwhite male workers increased steadily from 44 to 64.1
Long-term (more than 27 weeks) unemployment fell most heavily
57. THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 35, pt. I, at 82.

58. Id. at 82-84.
59. Id. at 86.
60. Id. at 87-88. Most studies have emphasized this conclusion. Walter R. Miles
concluded, in 1939, that age is not a reliable measure of a person's probable capacity for
work. W. MILES, PROBLEMS OF AGING 535-71 (E.V. Cowdry ed. 1939). Professor Welford
reached the same conclusion in 1951. A. WELFORD, SKILL AND AGE, AN EXPERIMENTAL
APPROACH 146,47 (1951). In 1956, the Twentieth Century Fund reported that, except for
high coordination work or piece work, the productivity of older workers up to 65 was not
significantly different from that of younger workers. The Fund writers attempted to conclude that productivity declined, but their conclusion was too noncommittal to contradict
the contrary conclusion of other authors. J. CORSON & J. MCCONNELL, supra note 32, at

58-61. For more recent discussion of this common prejudice, see H. Sheppard, Aging and
..Manpuwer Deve!opment, 11 AnNG AND Soc'Y 84-200 (1969).
The most amazing recent study of productivity and aging is T. Rich, An Exploratory.
Investigation of Old Age Employment in Select Industries with a Proposal (1967) (unpublished masters thesis in Springfield College Library). Professor Rich was interested in the
attitude of older workers toward their job, and conversely, company personnel managers'
attitudes toward older workers. The results of the survey were astoundingly consistent:
older workers were more willing to cooperate with management, to get along with younger
workers, to adjust to new technology; less likely to panic under pressure; and more willing
to accept responsibility than younger workers. Rich chose an age range of 40 to 64 which
coincided with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act protected class.
61. THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 35, at 97-99.
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on workers 45-64.2 This resulted usually in permanent unemployment. 3 Such early termination deprived older workers of social
security benefits at eligibility age and dramatically decreased
their pension plan rights under many company retirement programs."4
2. Recommendations for Action. The Labor Department
clearly had found overwhelming evidence of arbitrary age discrimination in employment practices in the five metropolitan
areas. "5 Inferentially, the same widespread discrimination existed
in other regions of the United States. The Department reviewed
state experience with anti-age discrimination laws. It concluded
that age discrimination in employment could be curbed only by
an effectively enforced anti-age discrimination statute. 6 The
Department made six specific recommendations to Congress:
(1) Pension plans and profit sharing plans should provide a
wider program of vesting rights in workers before normal retirement.
(2) Annuity contracts for workers should be studied.
(3) Workmen's compensation legislation needs to be reviewed
for its adverse impact on hiring and retaining older workers.
(4) Collective bargaining procedure should include a split seniority system for newly hired older workers integrated into existing seniority systems.
(5) The Labor Department should be authorized to continue
its education program among all employers. This program
should concentrate on retraining and rehabilitating older workers.
(6) Age discrimination in hiring and retention must be outlawed."
62. Id. The Labor Department cited its special project initiated in 1963 when the
Studebaker Corporation closed its assembly plant in South Bend, Indiana. Two years after
the plant closed (June 2, 1965), 508 of 3,827 workers over 50 who were laid off by Studebaker were still out of work, although they needed and were available to take any kind of
work. Id. at 100.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 102-04.
65. Id. pt. II, at 21. "There is persistent and widespread use of age limits in hiring
that in a great many cases can be attributed only to arbitrary discrimination against older
workers on the basis of age and regardless of ability. The possibility of new nonstatutory
means of dealing with such arbitrary discrimination has been explored. That area is
barren." H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprintedin [19671 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWs 2214.

66. State experience with statutes prohibiting discrimination in employment on the
basis of age indicates that such practice can be reduced by a well-administeredand wellenforced statute, coupled with an educational program. THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER,
supra note 35, pt. I, at 109-10.
67. See id. pt. II, at 21-25.
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The 1967 Age Discriminationin Employment Act

In 1967, President Johnson sent Congress a message on aid
for the aged. That message contained several significant passages
relating to age discrimination.
Hundreds of thousands not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired, find themselves jobless because of arbitrary age discrimination. Despite our present low rate of unemployment, there has
been a persistent average of 850,000 people aged 45 and over who
are unemployed ...
• . . In 1965, the Secretary of Labor reported to the Congress and to the President that approximately half of all private
job openings were barred to applicants over 55; a quarter were
closed to applicants over 45.
In economic terms, this is a serious-and senseless-loss to
a nation on the move. But the greater loss is the cruel sacrifice
in happiness and well-being which joblessness imposes on these
citizens and their families.6"
The House commenced hearings on anti-age discrimination legislation August 1, 1967. Legislation reached the Senate October 23,
1967 and passed November 6, 1967. A similar bill passed the
House December 4, and after conference committee work, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act passed both houses December 5-6, 1967.11
During House hearings, both houses agreed on the main aim
of the new Act: to outlaw age discrimination in employment practices for workers 40 to 64.70 The House thought the Act should be
administered and enforced by the Secretary of Labor, who would
deal with age discrimination cases on a case by case basis.7' The
Act made it unlawful for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire"
or to fire any worker because of that worker's age, and forbade
discrimination in terms and conditions of work because of age.
Section 4 of the Act, according to the Committee Report, also
prevented segregation or classification of employees on account of
age, or wage reductions on account of age."
68. S. REP. No. 1098, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 169 (1967).
69. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967).
70. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 2219. Testimony indicated that 40 is the age at which employment discrimination against older workers becomes apparent.
[1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2219-20.
71. Id. at -,
72. The section by section analysis shows that section 4 was intended to make it

unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions
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Any act prohibited by section 4, according to section 7, was
to be investigated and compliance enforced by the Secretary of
Labor 7 3 The House also indicated that an act which injured a
worker under section 4 of the Act would invoke the existing damage remedies of sections 16 and 17 of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, which permitted successful parties to recover actual lost pay,
attorneys' fees, and liquidated damages. Civil actions to enforce
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act could be filed in
federal district court for legal and equitable relief."
The ADEA purported to provide a sound remedy structure
for the widespread kind of age discrimination in employment that
The Older American Worker surveyed in 1965. Congress wanted
to combine a program of employer education and vocational rehabilitation with a program of enforcement of anti-discrimination
legislation. 5 It believed that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was:
rich in potential usefulness and that it will speed the other
changes necessary for full and effective use of older workers in
ways that will strengthen the economy and that will also reduce
the serious loss in happiness and well-being of those now unemployed or underemployed solely because of age.7"
If Congress legislated appropriately, the ADEA should pass structural analysis as a legislative document; it should be clear, consistent, and unambiguous.
or privileges of employment because of such individual's age; or (2) to limit,
segregate or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely af-

fect his status as an employee, because of his age; or (3) to reduce the wage
rate of any employee in order to comply with this act.
Id. at -,
[1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2216.
[19671 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2222.
73. Id. at -,
74. One of the major flaws in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act is its
incorporation by reference of the remedy section and statute of limitations section of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. According to 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970), liquidated damages
for future harm will be awarded only upon a showing of willful violations. The court will
have jurisdiction to grant both legal and equitable relief as appropriate. This may include
judgment compelling employment, reinstatement, promotion or enforcement of liabilities
for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid over-time compensation. No
real consideration seems to have been given to the fact that this incorporation by reference
severely restricted class actions under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, nor
that it incorporated a statute of limitations which was radically different from that contained in the 1967 Act.
75. STAFF OF SPECIAL SENATE COMM. ON AGING, DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING: 1967, S. REP.
No. 1098, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-28 (1967) [hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMrNTS INAGING,
1967].
76. Id. at 28.
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AGE DISCRIMINATION IN

EMPLOYMENT ACT

A.

Legislative Purposes of the Act

Section 2 of the Act makes four significant findings summarizing the history of age discrimination in employment:
-older workers are at a disadvantage in their effort to retain or
regain employment;
-arbitrary age limits for hiring and discharge are a common
practice which work to the disadvantage of older workers;
-older workers have a higher unemployment rate than younger

workers; and
is a burden on the free flow of
-arbitrary age discrimination
77
commerce.
interstate

Congress therefore concluded the Act should accomplish three
legislative purposes: it should promote the employment of older
persons for ability rather than age; it should prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment; and it should help employers
and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the im7
For analytical purposes, the remainpact of age on employments.
der of the Act should conform to a logical, consistent program for
administration and enforcement of these three legislative purposes without internal obstacles created by the Act itself.

B.

The EducationProgram

Section 3 of the Act required the Secretary of Labor to:
undertake studies and provide information to labor unions,
management and the general public concerning the needs and
77. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1970).
78. The legislative findings of section 2(b) of the Act parallel the findings of the Labor
Department in THE OLDER AmERICAN WORKER, supra note 35, pt. II, at 21. Since 1967, law
review commentators have analyzed and discussed the import of the purposes of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. For a representative sampling of the literature see
Agast'in, ,,,.Age,,", *.
r];firn tinn in Emplovment Act of 1967: A Critique, 19 N.Y.L.F.

309, 315-17 (1973); Kovarsky & Kovarsky, Economic, Medical and Legal Aspects o the
Age Discrimination Laws on Employment, 27 VAND. L. REv. 875, 875-93 (1974); Note,
Proving Discrimination Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 17 ARIZ. L.
REv. 495, 496-500 (1975); Note, Mandatory Retirement-A Vehicle for Age Discrimination, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 116, 129-30 (1975); Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: Available Federal Relief, 11 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PRoB. 281, 282, 338-42 (1975);
16 B.C. INDus. & COMM. L. REv. 688, 690-93 (1975); 45 U. CN. L. REv. 123, 127-28 (1975).
For a student work of special merit see Note, Damage Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 47 (1976). This note is based
upon the district court decision in Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp.
324 (D.N.J. 1975).
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abilities of older workers and their potentials for continued employment. ....
.,

To do this, the Secretary must implement a research program
oriented toward finding new ways to employ older workers. The
Labor Department also is to assist state agencies that enforce
state anti-age discrimination laws. Moreover, the Secretary must
assist private and public agencies in programs enforcing anti-age
discrimination measures." To do so, the Labor Department requires staff members to research the problems of older workers.
The annual appropriation, however, for all anti-age discrimination programs from 1967 to 1974 was only $3,000,000.81 The Labor
Department initially allocated only 69 positions to ADEA enforcement in 196982 and did not increase this number until fiscal
1975.9 The annual budget for all age discrimination programs
was $500,000 in 1969 and only $1,500,000 in 1974.8 No one was
assigned to ADEA research projects. In short, through neglect
and lack of specific program provisions in the 1967 Act, Congress
did not fund, and the Labor Department did not provide, any
significant educational and research program on the problems of
older workers from 1967 to 1975.
C.

CongressionalDefinition of Age Discrimination

Section 4 of the Act defined unlawful age discrimination in
employment. There are three prohibited activity categories: employer discrimination, employment agency discrimination, and
union discrimination.
1. Employer Discrimination.Subsection (a) of section 4
renders it unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way
79. 29 U.S.C. § 622(a) (1970).
80. Id.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 634 (1970). The 1974 amendments increased the annual appropriation
to $5,000,000. 29 U.S.C. § 634 (Supp. V 1975). The 1978 amendments deleted any reference to a specific sum and authorized "such sums as may be necessary to carry out this
chapter." 29 U.S.C.A. § 634 (West Supp. 1978).
82. STAFF OF SPECIAL SENATE COMM. ON AONO, DEWLoPMNTS IN AGING: 1973 AND
JANUARY-MARCH, 1974, S. REP. No. 846, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11I (1974). [hereinafter cited
as DEvELOPmENTs

83. Id.
84. Id.

iNAGING,
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which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply
with this chapter.U
The prohibitions, which echo the provisions of section 703(a) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,8 withstand only superficial examination. An employer cannot refuse to hire, discharge, segregate, or
classify his employees between 40 and 65 because of their age.
"Because of such individual's age," however, is at best overvague, at worst downright ambiguous. The phrase is analogous to
the common law notion of "proximate cause" which has terrorized personal injury law for 100 years. Can an employer categorize
employees who are (i) over 55, (ii) have less than 12 years of
formal education, and (iii) more than 20 years seniority, and
discharge all of them because they did not meet a job description
that required all workers to have completed high school? What
is the standard for "limit, segregate or classify" so that enforcement officers can ascertain what is forbidden by the Act?, Did
Congress intend to prohibit employers from taking into account
an employee's age in evaluating his performance, or is age one
discriminatory factor among many an employer may consider in
job selection, placement, hiring, and retention? Did Congress intend to codify the principle of seniority in retention practices?
The prohibitions in section 4(a) of the Act allow judges a
great deal of freedom in assigning and characterizing employer
activity as discriminatory or nondiscriminatory. If Congress
wished to avoid precise definition of a prohibited act, it succeeded.
2. Employment Agency Discrimination. Subsection (b)
defines prohibited activity for employment agencies:
It shall be unlawful for an employment agency to fail or to refuse
to refer for employment or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual because of such individual's age, or to classify or refer
for imnployment any individual on the basis of such individual's
87
age.
Other than the false command "It shall be unlawful," which
appears in all three subsections of section 4, this provision seems
clear. Any employment agency that does not refer workers 40-65
for employment breaks the law. It also breaks the law if it classi85. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1970).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).

87. 29 U.S.C. § 623(b) (1970).
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fies applicants for employment on the basis of their being between 40 and 65, and their being below 40. The committee report
accompanying the ADEA simply repeats the statutory language
in explaining its meaning.
3. Labor Union Discrimination.Congress also tried to reach
union activities. It therefore made it unlawful for a labor organization: " '
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual because of his age;
(2) to limit, segregate or classify its members or to classify or
fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, or as an applicant for employment, because of
such individual's age;
(3) to cause or attempt to cause any employer to discriminate
against an individual in violation of this section. 9
The committee report, as in subsections (a) and (b), simply
restates the statute to explain its meaning."
In the structure of the ADEA, the section which makes conduct unlawful follows the section on legislative findings and the
section authorizing the Department of Labor to investigate the
problems of aging and employment. The Act, however, does not
define or identify the class of protected citizens. The statute also
uses the false imperative "It shall be unlawful" to describe three
prohibitions classified as to object, rather than as to functional
discriminatory activities. The three sections were not drawn to
establish a parallel set of prohibited acts. Some acts forbidden to
a labor organization may be performed by an employment
agency, e.g., refuse to accept potential applicants for employment
because of age. Congress intended each of the three subsections
to prohibit the following specific acts:
88. The Act defines a labor organization as:
a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce and any
agent of such an organization and includes any organization of any kind, any
agency or employee representation committee, group, association or plan so
engaged in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose in
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment,
and any conference, general committee, joint or system board . ...
29 U.S.C. § 630(d) (1970).
89. Id. § 623(e) (1970).
90. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2221.

-,
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(1) classifying employees on the basis of chronological age;
(2) refusing to accept an application for employment on account of the applicant's chronological age;
(3) discharging an employee on account of the employee's
chronological age;
(4) any other act which discriminates against an employee or
applicant for employment on account of his chronological age.
Any employer, employment agency, or labor organization violating the ADEA is subject to the penalty provisions of the Act.
4. Age Limits. Section 4 did not limit age discrimination.
Theoretically, any classification of employees 18-35 favoring
younger over older employees, as most union apprentice training
programs do, violates the Act. Therefore, Congress limited the
application of section 4 by section 12, to employees over 40 and
less than 65." ' Consequently, union apprentice training programs
do not violate the Act, because their age limitations terminate
below the minimum age limitation of section 12. Nor would an
employer violate the Act by placing workers over 65 in an inferior
status to workers under 65. The 1978 amendments raise the mandatory retirement age to 70.
D.

Bona Fide Retirement Plan Escape Clause

Section 4(f) of the Act imparts Congressional approval to
three kinds of age discrimination. First, no employer, employment agency, or labor union violates the Act if it contravenes
sections (a), (b), (c), or (e) in furtherance of a bona fide occupa2
tional qualification based on chronological age.1 Second, the Act
does not prohibit an employer, employment agency, or labor organization from discriminating against a person on "reasonable
factors other than age.' 3 According to the original version of the
ADEA, an employer may follow an employee seniority system or
"any bona fide employee benefit plan. . . which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter,"'" even though it clas91. Section 12 states that "[t]he prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to
individuals who are at least forty years of age but less than sixty-five years of age." 29
U.S.C. § 631 (1970) (amended 1978).
92. It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a), (b), (c), or
(e) of this section where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business ....
Id. § 623(f)(1).

93. Id.
94. It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency or. labor
organization-
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sifies, or discriminates against employees on the basis of age. This
section creates interpretative problems: are these exceptions matters an employee must negate to prove a case of age discrimination under sections 4(a), (b), (c), or (e)? Is the employer required
to "confess and avoid" age discrimination by any of these three
defenses? Do these defenses have any practical application to an
employment agency or a labor organization? Does the "bona fide
retirement plan" exception authorize corporate "early out" programs that forcibly retire persons between 40 and 64, on the
ground these forced retirees will receive some pension program
benefits before "normal retirement" at 65? Under one plausible
interpretation, this subsection permits emasculation of the provisions of sections 4(a), (b), (c), and (e) by employers, if not by
labor organizations or employment agencies. A skilled employer
will be able to justify termination on "reasonable factors other
than age" or justify early dismissal by citing the existence of "a
bona fide retirement plan" that pays small benefits to early retirees compared with their former income.
E. Age Discriminationis a Wage Claim
Section 6 of the ADEA empowers the Secretary of Labor to
delegate persons to enforce the Act, and instructs him to cooperate with local, regional, and state anti-age discrimination agencies.95 It precedes section 7, the enforcement or penalty provisions
of the Act. Unfortunately, section 7(b) states that the ADEA will
be enforced by the "remedies and procedures"9 6 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The specific provisions of the FLSA incorporated
into the ADEA include:
1. Investigation Regulations. The Secretary of Labor is
bound to observe the same procedures in investigating an ADEA
case as he is in investigating a minimum wage or overtime act
violation." The Secretary and the Wage-Hour Division may compel attendance of witnesses at conciliation hearings by subpoena
under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.' 8
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide
employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension or insurance plan, which
is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such
employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual . ...
Id. § 623(f)(2). The 1978 amendments to section 4(f)(3) of ADEA adds a proviso against
forced early retirement. 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(2) (West Supp. 1978).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 625 (1970).
96. Id. § 626(b).
97. Id. § 211 (Supp. V 1975).
98. Id. § 209.
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2. Penalties and Civil Liability. Any action that violates
also violates 29 U.S.C. section 21511 which prohibits
ADEA
the
the withholding of wages payable as minimum wages, or the refusal to pay overtime for more than 40 hours work a week. Thus,
an ADEA action is also a "wage claim" for unpaid wages, for
which an aggrieved party can recover unpaid minimum wages or
overtime compensation, and liquidated damages.'0 Section 6(b),
however, limits recovery of liquidated damages to "cases of willful violations of this chapter."'"' Also, a successful ADEA plaintiff
can recover reasonable attorney's fees and court costs from his
employer. 0 2 This prescription for simplistic relief incorporated
from the FLSA must be read into the provisions of section 7(c)
which give "any person aggrieved" a "civil action in any court of
competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will
effectuate the purposes of this chapter." Although the drafters
may have intentionally limited the remedies available under the
ADEA to those provided unpaid minimum wage claimants under
the FLSA, 0 3 it is more probable that no one paid much attention
to the conflict between the broad language of section 7(c), and 29
U.S.C. section 216(a) and (b).
3. Statute of Limitations. For reasons unascertainable from
the committee report or contemporary debate, Congress incor99. Id. § 626(b) (1970).
100. Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207
of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount
of their unpaid minimum wage, or their unpaid overtime compensation as the
case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.
Id. § 216(b) (Supp. V 1975).
101. Id. § 626(b) (1970).
102. Id. § 216(b) (Supp. V 1975). The language used seems to suggest that the remedy
structure of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act is not tied to that of the Fair
Labor Standards Act alone. Nonetheless, the common interpretation of section 7 is that
the remedies enumerated in section 7 and in the Fair Labor Standards Act are all the
remedies available to an aggrieved party under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. Consequently, the courts have been unwilling to go beyond an award of back pay,
reinstatement, liquidated damages in rare instances, or injunction against continuing
violations such as advertisements. See, e.g., Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208,
1217 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 230, 239 (N.D. Ill.
1973), rev'd, 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974); Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F.
Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Brennan v. Weis Markets, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 850 (M.D.
Pa. 1973); Hodgson v. Bowman, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 165 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).
103. This conclusion, except for Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 419 F.
Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1976), and Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Corp., 404 F. Supp.
324 (D.N.J. 1975) is consistent with the case law cited in note 102 supra. Rogers has been
overruled and is no longer precedent. Bertrand has not yet been reviewed by the Seventh
Circuit. The limiting of remedies to those enumerated in the statute is consistent with
earlier cases under the Fair Labor Standards Act. See, e.g., Crabb v. Welden Bros., 164
F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1947); Northwestern Yeast Co. v. Broutin, 133 F.2d 628 (6th Cir. 1943).
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porated the two year statute of limitations contained in section 6
of the Portal to Portal Act into the ADEA.10 1 This incorporation
conflicts with the provisions of section 7(d) which fix an internal
statute of limitations contingent upon the date of notice to the
Secretary of Labor of intent to sue. 0 5 Arguably then a court might
conclude that the notice requirements in section 7(d) are not a
statute of limitations.
F.

Remedy Structure-Right to Sue

Section 7(c) of the ADEA authorizes a civil suit in federal or
state courts to recover unpaid wages, liquidated damages, attorney's fees, and court costs, and to receive "equitable relief." No
injured party can file a civil action, however, without first
complying with the provisions of section 7(d):
No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this
section until the individual has given the Secretary not less than
60 days' notice of an intent to file such action. Such notice shall
be filed(1) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice
occurred, or
(2) in a case to which section 633(b) of this title applies,
within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, or within 30 days after receipt by the individual of
notice of termination of proceedings under state law,
whichever is earlier.'"
The Secretary must attempt conciliation of a dispute when notified by a private party under this section that the private party
intends to sue. 07 This provision must be read with section 14(b)
which says:
In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State
which has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority
to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice, no suit
104. 29 U.S.C. § 255 (Supp. V 1975).
105. Id. § 626(d) (1970). Section 7(c) provides that:
Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this
chapter: Provided, that the right of any person to bring such action shall terminate upon the commencement of an action by the Secretary to enforce the right
of such employee under this chapter.
Id. § 626(c).
106. Id. § 626(d). The 1978 amendments attempt to provide equitable exceptions to
the claim bar provisions of this section. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d) (West Supp. 1978).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970).
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may be brought under section 626 of this title before the expiration of 60 days after proceedings have been commenced under
the state law unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated. 108
Appellate courts have construed these two sections as
"jurisdictional" requirements, which, if not observed, bar an injured party from suit.109
G.

Other Provisions of the Act

To complete the structural analysis of the ADEA, several
ancillary provisions need be reviewed.
1. Definitions. Section 11 contains the ADEA's definitions,
which instead of preceding the operative clauses, follow them as
an afterthought. Some of these definitions are important to the
enforcement of the Act:
a. employer is "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 25 or more employees for each working day of 20
or more calendar weeks.""*
b. Labor organization is an entity engaged in an industry affecting commerce, any agent of that entity, or any joint council,
which exists for the purpose of dealing with employers concerning the terms and conditions of work. However, the entity must
have at least 25 members to be subject to the Act."' This excludes many small collective bargaining units from the Act.
c. Industry affecting commerce is any activity in commerce in
which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct the free flow of
commerce, namely, any activity or industry affecting commerce
as defined by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959.111 This definition seems to exclude local, regional,
and state employees. However, an extended definition of
108. Id. § 633(b).
109. See, e.g., Adams v. Federal Signal Corp., 559 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1977); Rucker
v. Great Scott Supermarkets, 528 F.2d 393, 394-95 (6th Cir. 1976); Moses v. Falstaff
Brewing Co., 525 F.2d 92, 94 (8th Cir. 1975); Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367,
1370 (6th Cir. 1975); Law v. United Airlines, Inc., 519 F.2d 170, 171 (10th Cir. 1975);
Edwards v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc., 515 F.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (5th Cir.
1975); Curry v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 513 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1975); Powell v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485, 488-89 (5th Cir. 1974); Goger v. H.K. Porter
Co., Inc., 492 F.2d 13, 17-18 (3rd Cir. 1974). It remains to be seen whether the 1978
amendments alter these decisions.
110. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1970). This section was amended in 1974 to include a person
engaged in "industry affecting commerce who has 20 or more employees." 29 U.S.C. §
630(b) (Supp. V 1975).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 630(d) (1970).
112. Id. § 630(h).
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"employee" added in 1974 now expressly includes such employees .

3i

2. Required Notice. Section 8 of the Act requires every
employer, employment agency, and labor organization to post a
notice on its premises stating information about the ADEA."'
3. Criminal Penalty. Section 10 imposes a $500 fine or imprisonment for one year, or both, upon conviction of interfering
with or impeding a duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor engaged in the performance of his duties."3
4. Rules and Regulations. Section 5 requires the Secretary
of Labor to continue to study age discrimination in employment." 6 He must submit a progress report on research and enforcement each January to Congress." 7
5. Incidental Penalties and ProhibitedActs. Section 4(d)
forbids retaliation against any person who takes part in the investigation or trial of an ADEA complaint." 8 Section 4(e) prohibits
discriminatory listing or advertising that shows age requirements.""
H.

Structural Defects in the ADEA

This structural analysis of the ADEA shows the Act, when
adopted, had inherent weaknesses. First, the notice and deferral
periods required by sections 7 and 14 were unwieldy and almost
impossible to understand. The Act did not state clearly the duty
113. Id. § 630(f) (Supp. V 1975).
114. Id. § 627 (1970).
115. Id. § 629.
116. Id. § 624.
117. Id. § 632. The 1978 amendments require the Secretary to provide a special report
on the effects of raising the mandatory retirement age to 70. 29 U.S.C.A. § 624(a)(1)(A)
(West Supp. 1978).
118. It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against
any member thereof or applicant for membership, because such individual,
member or applicant for membership has opposed any practice made unlawful
by this section, or because such individual, member or applicant for membership has made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1970).
119. It shall be unlawful for an employer, labor organization, or employment agency to print or publish, or cause to be printed or published, any notice
or advertisement relating to employment by such employer or membership in
or any classification or referral for employment by such an employment agency,
indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on
age.
Id. § 623(e).
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of an aggrieved party to exhaust available state and federal administrative procedures before instigating civil litigation. Second, the Act failed to define the elements of an age discrimination
complaint, or to establish the duty of the aggrieved party relative
to presenting a prima facie case of discrimination. Third, the
remedy structure of the Act, borrowed from the Fair Labor Standards Act, was limited in scope and pecuniary reward for successful prosecution of a claim. Fourth, the Secretary of Labor received
no efficient delegation of authority to investigate and try ADEA
cases. Fifth, the Act did not apply to half the workers between
40 and 64 who were being victimized by age discrimination.
Sixth, it did not cover municipal, regional, or state employees,
nor did it apply to Federal employees.
In 1974, Congress revised the ADEA and extended it to state
and local government employees. Congress also added a new sec2 0
tion 15 which made the Act applicable to Federal employees.
Congress, however, did not substantially revise the original
ADEA despite continuous warning from the Labor Department
that the Act was not working. Moreover, haphazard and ineffectual judicial handling of the ADEA compounded the problems
inherent in the structure of the Act.
IV.

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN

EMPLOYMENT ACT
A.

Non-Judicial Follow-up Studies

Congress has had an opportunity to evaluate the ADEA
every January, because the Labor Department faithfully submits
its annual report on the Act. These reports also form the basis for
the Senate Committee on Aging's own annual report,
Developments in Aging. Comparison of the Labor Department
and Senate reports to the stated purposes of the ADEA reveals
some notion of the success of the Act.
1. Congressional Follow-up Studies. In 1967, Congress
found that older workers were disadvantaged, subject to arbitrary
limits on hiring and discharge on account of age, and unemployed
2
more often and for longer periods of time than younger workers." '
It established three legislative objectives for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to remedy these social ills: promoting
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than
age, prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination in employment, and
120. Id. § 633(a) (Supp. V 1975).
121. Id. § 621(a)-(b) (1970).
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helping employers and workers find ways of meeting problems
arising from the impact of age on employment. Within two years
after adoption of the ADEA, Congress received recommendations
for fundamental revisions in the 1967 Act.'2 These recommendations were incorporated in a working paper called Employment
Aspects of the Economics of Aging. '2 Further Congressional studies appeared in 1972 and 1974.
a. Employment Aspects of the Economics of Aging. The
1970 Task Force on the Economics of Aging studied the economic
results of age discrimination in employment. The task force
quickly pointed out that the first result of the decline in participation in the work force was an increased dependency ratio; more
non-productive persons were depending on less producing persons
for existence. 2 ' The 1970 dependency ratio was 93.2 persons depending on every 100 working persons.'2 In 1967, the year in
which the ADEA became law, unemployment clearly fell most
heavily upon workers over 45.
Table 1.

Male Unemployment 1967126

Percent with 3 or more spells
of unemployment

Age
16-19
20-24
45-55
55-64
65 plus

20.5
19.2
22.7
28.2
30.3

This table clearly indicates that male workers over 45 were much
more likely to have to face unemployment than men under 45.
The trend was more pronounced the closer the worker came to 65.
This chart showed a steady drop in the number of men over 60
still in the labor force.
Table 2. Labor Force Participation (in percent) 127
Actual

Males, age

1954

1960

60-64

84.3

65-69

58.2

Projected

1965

1970

1980

79.5

76.5

76.9

75.7

45.8

42.1

36.4

31.3

122. STAFF OF SPECIAL SENATE COMM. ON AGING, DEvEWOPMENTs INAGING: 1969, S. REP.
No. 875, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1970) [hereinafter cited as DEv9LOPm Nrs INAGING, 1969].
123. STAFF OF SPECIAL SENATE COMM. ON AGING, 91st Cong., 1st Seas., ECONOMICS OF
AGING: ToWARD A FULL SHABE IN ABUNDANCE (Comm. Print 1970) [hereinafter cited as
ECONOMICS OF Aoimo].
124. Id. at 4.
125. Id. at 5.
126. Id. at 6.
127. Id. at 7.
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The Task Force's projections indicated that if current participation trends continued, one out of six men 55 to 59 would not be
working at age 64.1n This is in effect long-term unemployment
which leads to involuntary retirement. 2I The Task Force stated:
Various indices suggest that the critical period in the work-lives
of adult men occurs sometime during their late forties and early
fifties. For example, with rare exceptions in every year since
1947 the unemployment rate among men began to rise after the
age category of 35-44.'3
The Task Force recommended, among other things, that Congress fund a rapid increase in staff support to enforce the ADEA.
The Task Force noted that in three years the Labor Department
made no attempt to study the causes13 of involuntary retirement
as mandated by section 5 of the Act:'

Congress itself must take a long, hard look at the effect of
involuntary retirement policies on the lives of individuals who
must leave their jobs, and on the effect of these policies on the
economy and social fabric of the nation. Because employment
income is clearly so much higher than retirement income, individuals should have choices, alternatives as to whether they
wish to continue to work or to retire.3 2

Congress, however, did not respond to this warning with appropriate action.
b. Developments in Aging, 1972. 13 The Senate Committee
Aging Report for 1972 was a scathing denunciation of the status
quo in age discrimination in employment. The ADEA had been
on the books for five years, during which period the Labor Department had filed 136 civil actions to enforce the Act. The report
neglected to state the outcome of these 136 civil actions. The
Department's annual report for 1972 showed that refusals to hire
on account of age had increased from 683 cases to 818 cases in
1972. The same report showed an increase in reported failures to
promote older workers.13 Despite the increase in reported violations, the Wage-Hour Division had 69 persons assigned to enforce
the ADEA, down five from 1971. It asked for an appropriation of
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id. at 10-12.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 13.
Id.

133. STAFF OF SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, DEvELOPMENTS IN AGING:

1972

AND JANUARY-

MARCH, 1973, S. REP. No. 147, 93rd Cong., 1st Ses. (1973) [hereinafter cited as DEVopMENTS IN AGING, 1972].

134. Id. at 66.
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only $1,451,000 for enforcement, against its appropriation ceiling
of $3,000,000.11 1972 followed the 1970-71 recession. Unemployment for workers of all ages remained very high. However, older
workers above 45 continued to lose their jobs during 1972 at a
faster rate than the general unemployment rate.Ix
On the strength of its examination, the Senate Committee on
Aging recommended amending the ADEA to include state and
local governmental employers and employers with 20 instead of
25 employees under the Act's coverage, and to increase the appropriation limit from $3,000,000 to $5,000,000. 37 The Committee
probably should have recommended redesigning the enforcement
system for the ADEA, because its report showed how poorly the
present enforcement system functioned.
c. Developments in Aging, 1974. '3 In fiscal 1973, the Department of Labor found almost 15,000 American workers 40 to
65 were victimized by age discrimination in employment, '39 and
found more than 2,900 American employers to be violating the
ADEA. 140 Still, ADEA enforcement activities were funded at the
low rates shown in Developments in Aging, 1972. " The Labor
Department noted that the "25 employee limit" on ADEA coverage in effect sanctioned age discrimination against half of all
workers 40-64 in America." 2 The amendments proposed in
Developments in Aging, 1972 were still under consideration. They
were not to be adopted for four more months." 3
d. Recent Developments. There were no amendments to
the ADEA between April, 1974 and April, 1978. Most suggestions
for changing the Act emanated from outside Congress. In 1974, a
student note"' contended that the available statistical evidence
did not support 65 as the upper limit for outlawing arbitrary age
discrimination in employment, and proposed extending the Act's
protection to anyone over 65.1"1 In the same year, Professor Irving
Kovarsky and Dr. Joel Kovarsky suggested extending the Act to
collective bargaining agreements, which would make age discrim135. Id. at 67.
136. Id. at 68.
137. Id. at 72.
138. DEvELoPmENTS INAGING, 1973, supra note 82.
139. Id. at 110.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 111.
142. Id.
143. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 95256, 88 Stat. 74 (adopted Apr. 8, 1974).
144. Note, Age Discriminationin Employment: CorrectingA ConstitutionallyInfirm
Legislative Judgment, 47 So. CAL. L. REv. 1311 (1974).
145. Id. at 1315-18, 1346-52.

42

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 2:15

ination a grievable offense under current practice.' 40 In 1975, a
4 7 recommended extending the upper age
second student note"
limit of section 12 to workers above 65, and establishing a special
agency to enforce the ADEA.
2. Labor Department Reports. Much of the earlier Labor
Department reports were reprinted in Developments in Aging,
1972 and Developments in Aging, 1974. The Labor Department
Annual Reports for 1976, 1977, and 1978 provide additional insight into the present efficacy of the Wage-Hour Division's ADEA
enforcement efforts.
a. 1976 Annual Report. The 1976 Labor Department report
covered the period from July 1, 1974, to June 30, 1975. During
fiscal 1975, 4,717 complaints were filed with the Wage-Hour Division alleging some form of age discrimination in employment.'"
The Wage-Hour Division claimed to have provided some form of
relief to 3,376 workers, including many workers who did not file
a personal complaint against their employer on account of age
discrimination.' 9 The Wage-Hour Division included in its
"workers aided" statistics workers in establishments in which one
worker filed a complaint, and the side effect of conciliation was
to protect others not yet discharged. The Wage-Hour Division
:
cited 1,642 employers for ADEA violations in fiscal 1975.' 5
Twenty-three hundred and fifty workers received back pay, or
some other form of monetary relief in fiscal 1975; the total
amount of wages or compensation collected was estimated to be
$6,600,000.5 ' The Labor Department also reported that more
than two-thirds of all suits filed by private152litigants in fiscal 1975
were dismissed on "procedural grounds.'
This brief summary demonstrates that the Wage-Hour Division's enforcement program from July 1, 1974, to June 30, 1975
was not an overwhelming success. Assuming that 2,350 complainants out of 4,717 recovered some benefits during fiscal 1975, the
Labor Department batting average is .498. Measured against relief sought in dollars, however, the Department's batting average
146. Kovarsky & Kovarsky, Economic, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Age DiscriminationLaws in Employment, 27 VAND. L. REv. 839, 885-86 (1974).
147. Note, Mandatory Retirement-A Vehicle for Age Discrimination,51 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 116, 135 (1974).
148. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT AcT OF 1967, ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 6 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 ANNUAL REPORT].
149. Id. at vii.

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 14.
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is .411.11 Because the damages allowed in age discrimination
cases are easily calculated, this does not represent the glowing
figure Labor seems to represent it to be.
b. 1977 Annual Report.'5 4 During fiscal 1976 the Wage-Hour
Division obtained monetary relief for ADEA complainants in 742
cases.' The Wage-Hour Division recovered $3,548,751.30 in back
pay, liquidated damages, and other compensible items.' The
Wage-Hour Division recovered 44.4% of all the money damages
it demanded of employers during fiscal 1976.111 During the year
ending December 31, 1976, the Wage-Hour Division filed 47 civil
suits to enforce the ADEA.5 The Wage-Hour Division and the
Labor Department claimed that the 2,161 complaints filed during
fiscal 1976 represented the grievances of 5,121 employees. Thus
the real batting average for ADEA enforcement during 1976 is less
than the .380 reported for resolution of all complaints. In 1976,
age discrimination was widely reported to the Wage-Hour Division, but very seldom alleviated by conciliation or by litigation.
c. Current Enforcement Experience. The Labor Department shifted its fiscal reporting to a fiscal year commencing September 21, 1976. Between June 21, 1976, and September 21, 1976,
the Wage-Hour Division received 818 complaints.'5 9 The WageHour Division obtained some compensation for 141 employees
affected by these complaints, which represents a .172 batting
average.6 0 A memorandum circulated internally to ADEA compliance officers in May, 1977 stated that ADEA compliance regulations were the least effective program administered by the
Wage-Hour Division in terms of cost/benefit ratio to injured parties. '' President Carter's Executive Reorganization Plan transferred all ADEA enforcement to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in early 1978, making new enforcement data
very difficult to use and to derive. The 1978 Labor Department
Annual Report on the ADEA has not been issued as of November,
1978.
153. Id.
154. U.S.

DEP'T OF LABOR, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT

REPORT TO CONGRESS,

1977 [hereinafter cited as 1977

ACT

OF

1967,

ANNUAL

ANNUAL REPORT].

155. Id. at 3.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 19.
159. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Statistics on Compliance-Monthly Report by Program
Phase for Month ending September 20, 1976 (1977).
160. Id.
161. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Administrative Report (N.D. 1971) (in possession of WageHour Division, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Boston, Mass.).
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An Analysis of JudicialDecisionson The Age Discrimination
in Employment Act

Between 1969 and June 1, 1977, there were 147 reported decisions on ADEA cases reported in the West System and in the
Bureau of National Affairs Employment Practices Reporter.
From June 1, 1977, to August 9, 1978, 127 decisions were reported
in the same systems and in the Commerce Clearing House Employment Practices Decisions Reporter. The reported decisions
include district court, court of appeals, and Supreme Court cases.
In 1977, the first 147 cases reported in these systems were the
object of intensive study to determine why plaintiffs won or lost
ADEA cases.' That study was based on two assumptions: first,
nearly all ADEA decisions had been surveyed and classified, and
second, any unreported decisions in ADEA cases would follow the
pattern of these reported decisions. The survey included both
interlocutory rulings at trial and appellate levels, and final decisions on the merits. For that study, and for this follow-up, each
decision between the same litigants was analyzed separately to
reduce the basis for the decision to the narrowest possible under
the rules of decision established by the ADEA. Each case was
therefore assigned a holding on the narrowest possible ground for
decision to avoid multiple regressions. The 1977 study confirmed
the Labor Department's contention that more than half of all
ADEA cases plaintiffs lost were dismissed on procedural issues.
The results of the 1977-78 follow-up study appear below. In the
last fourteen months, ADEA plaintiffs have been doing somewhat
better in the courts, although it is too soon to announce a trend
toward more effective judicial enforcement of the Act.
1. Reasons Given for Decisions. (See table following)
From 1969 to June 1, 1977, the plaintiff won approximately
41% of all cases, the defendant won approximately 59% of all
cases. The most frequently cited judicial reason for deciding an
ADEA case prior to June 1, 1977, was sufficiency or insufficiency
of notice to the Labor Department, cited in 42 cases, 11 decisions
162. For the empirical investigation of the causes for winning and losing ADEA cases,
see Reed, The First Ten Years of the Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 4 OHIo N.
L. REv. 748, 759 (1977).

1978]

Age Discrimination
Table 3. Rank of Reasons Given for Decision, Cases
Decided June 1, 1977 to August 9, 1978
Reason
for
Winning

Rank
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Reason

Cases

Nature of Remedy
Notice to USDL
Deferral to State
Sufficiency of
Evidence
16
Bona Fide Retirement Plan
8
Jury trial rights
7
Prerequisite for
class action
5
Refusal to follow
conciliation
procedure
3
Bona fide occupational qualification #
1
ADEA constitutional limitation on
state power #
1
Injunctive relief #
0
Miscellaneous*
15
TOTAL

IL27

Reason
for
Losing

Total

No.

%

No.

22.1
17.3
16.5

13
9
11

20.6
14.3
17.5

15
13
10

12.6

5

7.9

11

17.2

6.3
5.5

3
4

4.8
6.4

5
3

7.8
4.7

3.8

4

6.4

1

1.6

2.4

2

3.2

1

1.6

0.8

1

1.6

0

0.0

0.8
0.0
11.8

1
0
10

1.6
0.0
15.9

0
0
5

0.0
0.0
7.8

100.0

63

100.0

64

100.0

T

Notes: # Although these categories fall below the 2 case cut-off for
reporting as a separate reason, these categories played a significant part
in the 1969-77 study discussed in part in 4 OHIo N. L. REV. 748, 759
(1977), and it is fascinating to see the decline in litigation on these
issues in one year's time.
* Miscellaneous other reasons include one case each decided on the
basis of mistake on employer's identity card, whether a government employee gets trial de novo on review of civil service action, leave for a
pro se plaintiff to amend complaint, the constitutional right to work
after 70, misnomer of defendant's employer, lack of civil state action for
relief from age discrimination in Michigan, use of the 3 year statute of
limitations for willful violations, tolling of the statute of limitations,
and no reason. Two cases each were decided on the application of the
fifth amendment due process clause to age discrimination, the application of the fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection
clauses to age discrimination, and two cases were per curiam decisions
without opinions.
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for the plaintiff, and 31 for the defendant. This represented 28.6%
of all cases decided under the ADEA. Twenty-two cases cited
sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to support the plaintiff's
case, 6 times in plaintiff's favor, and 16 times against the plaintiff. These cases represented 15.0% of all decisions. The issue of
judicial deference to state agency enforcement of state anti-age
discrimination laws came up 19 times, third in importance in
ADEA cases, accounting for 12.9% of all decisions. Fourteen cases
on this issue were decided for the plaintiff, 5 for the defendant.
The fourth highest reason for decision, the nature of the remedy
provided for ADEA litigants, including the measure of damages,
the type of harm compensible under the ADEA, and the theory
of a prima facie case, came up 15 times, accounting for 10.2% of
all decisions, of which 10 cases went for the plaintiff, and 5 went
for the defendant.
The 127 cases decided in the past 14 months, on the other
hand, show a marked shift in emphasis and in relative impact.
The plaintiff won 63 cases during the past 14 months, while losing
64 cases, which is about as close to the type of win-lose probabilities established by coin toss as one may come. The most frequently cited reason for a judicial decision in the past 14 months
has been some aspect of the nature of the remedy provided by the
ADEA, which appeared in 28 cases, 13 for the plaintiff and 15
for the defendant, followed by notice or lack thereof to the
Labor Department, appearing 22 times, 9 for the plaintiff, and 13
for the defendant. The third largest number of cases was decided
on the issue of deference to state anti-age discrimination law
enforcement agencies. This reason appeared in 11 cases for the
plaintiff and 10 for the defendant, for a total of 21 cases, representing 16.5% of all decisions. The fourth highest reason was
sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence, which showed up in 16
cases, 5 for and 11 against the plaintiff.
The largest remaining category of ADEA cases during the
past 14 months were those dealing with the issue of whether or
not the plaintiff had been retired pursuant to a bona fide retirement plan. Eight cases were decided on this issue, 3 for and 5
against the plaintiff, making up 6.3% of all decisions. The remaining decisions included 7 cases on jury trial rights, 1 each on
bona fide occupational qualifications, tolling the statute of limitations, application of due process and equal protection rights
under the ADEA, and several other reasons already discussed in
the notes to Table 7.
The 63 cases in which plaintiffs succeeded in preserving their
age discrimination act claims against the defendant from June 1,
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1977, to August 9, 1978, showed some changes from the distribution of the 61 cases decided between 1969 and 1977, which went
in favor of the plaintiff. The largest number of cases decided for
the plaintiff in the earlier study, 14, constituting 23.0% of all 61
cases, were on the issue of whether or not the plaintiff had to defer
to state anti-age discrimination agencies before seeking federal
relief. The largest number of cases in the past 14 months determined for the plaintiff, 13, were on the issue of the nature of the
remedy, the kind of damages, whether punitive damages were
available, recovery for pain and suffering, and the like. This represented 20.6% of all decisions for the plaintiff. The 8 year sample
listed as second in importance to judges in ruling for plaintiffs,
the fact of proper notice to the Department of Labor. This factor
appeared 11 times, representing 18.0% of all cases for the plaintiff. The second highest reason for deciding in favor of the plaintiff in the 1977-78 survey was deferral to state anti-age discrimination enforcement, which occurred 11 times, representing 17.5%
of all plaintiff's decisions. The third place in the 8 year study
went to nature of remedy, with 10 cases representing 16.4% of all
decisions for the plaintiff. The third largest number of decisions
for the plaintiff, 9, were on the issue of proper notice to the Labor
Department, constituting 14.3% of all decisions.
The implications of this shift may be quite significant. As
cases construing the plaintiff's compliance with notice provisions
under the ADEA decline because litigants no longer try to find
equities to by-pass lack of notice, the courts have been turning
their attention to the measure of damages, the type of damages,
and the theory of recovery under the ADEA. At this point, the
change in emphasis over such a short period of time does not lead
to a conclusion that notice law under the ADEA is settled, but
the new figures indicate a more profound judicial attempt to
wrestle with the remedy structure and proof problems inherent in
ADEA litigation.
In the 14 months between June, 1977, and August, 1978, the
plaintiff in 64 ADEA cases lost, either on the merits, on an interlocutory motion vital to his case, or on a "technicality." In the 8
years prior to June, 1977, 36% of all cases lost by plaintiffs were
lost on account of the plaintiffs failure to comply with the required notice of suit to the Labor Department specified by section
7 of the ADEA. In the past 14 months, this percentage has declined to 20.3% of all decisions, representing the second greatest
reason for deciding against the plaintiff. The reason most often
given since June, 1977 for plaintiff's losing has been the nature
of the remedy, appearing 15 times and representing 23.4% of all
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decisions against the plaintiff. In third place, accounting for 11
losing decisions, is insufficiency of evidence to support a verdict
or judgment, which represented 17.2% of all decisions. Deferral
to state enforcement agencies accounted for 10 cases lost by plaintiffs, making it fourth in importance and representing 15.6% of
all decisions. In the 8 year survey, sufficiency of evidence was
cited in 16 cases, comprising 18.6% of all losses. Deferral to state
agencies was also fourth in the 8 year survey, representing 5 cases
or 5.8% of all losing cases. The bona fide retirement plan defense
won 5 cases for defendants in 1977-78 for 7.8% of all cases lost by
plaintiffs. In the 8 year survey, bona fide retirement plan defenses
won 9 cases for defendants, representing 9.3% of all cases lost by
plaintiffs.
2. Decisions not on Merits. In reviewing the findings reported in Part 1, some of the reasons for decisions can be classified as "substantive" or "decisions on the merits." In this class
belong:
1969-77 Survey

1977-78 Survey

No.

%

No.

%

Sufficiency of evidence
Nature of remedy

29
31

14.2
15.2

16
28

12.6
22.1

(c) Bona fide retirement plan
(d) Bona fide occupational

11

5.4

8

6.3

8

3.9

1

0.8

4

2.0

1

0.8

54

42.6

(a)
(b)

qualification

(e) ADEA is constitutional
limitation on state power
TOTAL

83

40.7

In the class of "procedural" or "decisions not on the merits"
would be the following:
1969-77 Survey

1977-78 Survey

No.

%

No.

%

(a) Notice to U.S. Labor Dept.
(b) Deferral to state agency

50
28

24.5
13.7

22
21

17.3
16.5

(c) Right to jury trial
(d) Refusal to follow conciliation
procedure
(e) Injunction appropriate relief

11

5.4

7

5.5

8
5

3.9
2.5

3
0

2.4
0.0

7
12

3.4
5.9

5
15

3.8
11.8

121

59.3

73

57.3

(f) Met prerequisites for class
action
(g) Miscellaneous
TOTAL

Without regard to outcome, nearly 2 out of 3 ADEA cases are
still determined on non-substantive grounds. When the losing
record is analyzed, it looks like this:
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1969-77 Survey

1977-78 Survey

No.

%

No.

%

Notice to U.S. Labor Dept.
Deferral to state agency
Right to jury trial
Failure to follow conciliation
procedure
(e) Met prerequisites for class
action
(f) Miscellaneous

35
13
8

29.7
11.0
6.8

13
10
3

20.3
15.6
4.7

6

5.1

1

1.6

3
7

2.5
5.9

1
5

1.6
7.8

TOTAL

72

61.0

33

51.6

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

This indicates the Labor Department's assertion that 2 of 3
ADEA claims are dismissed on technicalities by the courts certainly was true for the 8 years between 1969 and 1977. Since June
1, 1977, however, only slightly over half the cases decided against
the plaintiff have been based on procedural or technical issues,
rather than the merits of the case.
V.

JUDICIAL CONsTucrION OF LABILITY UNDER THE ADEA.

A.

The Legal Standard for a Prima Facie Case of Age
Discriminationin Employment
The preceding analysis should demonstrate the ADEA has
been frustrated by a conjunction of its structural ambiguities and
the ineffective mediation system Congress adopted to deal with
non-judicial adjustment of ADEA complaints. At the same time,
the courts have been stumbling toward a doctrine of prima facie
liability bearing some semblance to the doctrines evolved under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
1. The Early Cases. Prima facie liability under the ADEA
did not seem to be an issue in early ADEA decisions. For example, Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co. ' was a case filed by six Monsanto employees who were discharged effective May 1, 1969 from
the El Dorado, Arkansas, nitrogen plant which was being shut
down by the company. These six were involuntarily retired,
rather than reassigned to a different plant. Monsanto management screened its employees at El Dorado to decide whom to
retain, and prepared evaluation sheets on all personnel; twelve
were retained, ten were discharged. Only three evaluated employees were under 40. After shutdown, the average age of the three
departments affected, Maintenance, Manufacturing, and Per163. 320 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1971).
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sonnel, declined slightly. 6 4 All the plaintiffs contended termination should have been by seniority rather than by departmentwide evaluation, asserting the ADEA created a seniority system
for all employees. Chief Judge Oren Harris rejected this view:
The method of the company's impartial evaluation of the ability
and job performance of each of the plaintiffs and other employees evaluated by Monsanto was based upon established factors
and criteria ordinarily utilized for such purpose. The Court concludes that the differentiation resulting from the application of
such factors and criteria in the plan of evaluation which Monsanto used was based on reasonable factors other than age and
in the opinion of the Court constitutes a lawful practice envisioned under 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f).165
This case pretty well decided the ADEA did not establish a seniority system that allowed those with the greatest time on the job
to resist removal.
6
In Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,' the plaintiff won
a jury verdict on the allegation that Penn-Dixie willfully discharged him because of his age. The district court overturned the
jury verdict on a motion for judgment n.o.v., finding the plaintiff
was not within the Act's protection because he was fired prior to
the effective date of the Act, although his five weeks paid vacation carried his salary period into the Act's effective date. Chief
Judge Sidney 0. Smith added, in dicta, an explanation of his
refusal to find that Monroe was not discharged by reason of age,
without elaborating on the traditional notion that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury verdict. Unfortunately, no re67
statement of the facts occurs in the opinion.
68 failed to pass on the
Cochran v. Ortho PharmaceuticalCo.
theory of plaintiffs complaint because Judge Mitchell dismissed
the suit on the ground the plaintiff did not file the necessary
notice of intent to sue with the Labor Department.' In Gebhard
v. GAF Corp., 7 0 the plaintiffs, four salaried supervisors, involuntarily retired by GAF Corporation, sued on an implied contract
theory. GAF supposedly induced them to render continued serv164. Maintenance from 48.4 to 47.3; manufacturing from 52.5 to 51.5; personnel from
53.6 to 52.5. Id. at 1180.
165. Id. at 1180-81.
166. 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
167. Id. at 234.
168. 376 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. La. 1971).
169. Id. at 303.
170. 59 F.R.D. 504 (D.D.C. 1973).
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ices by guaranteeing their employment to 65. "1The court held the
so-called implied contract void, however, because it did not comply with the Statute of Frauds. Further, the GAF retirement
plan directly refuted the existence of such an implied contract,
because it provided for both voluntary and involuntary retirement at 55. Finally, the plaintiffs simply had not filed their notice
within 180 days of discharge date, and were thus unable to sue.,7
Some helpful guidelines appeared prior to 1974. In Hodgson
v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 71 3 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois held a bench trial in which the
Wage-Hour Division was able to prove that Greyhound Lines
engaged in discriminatory hiring practices. Judge Parsons held
that the defendant had refused to consider employing anyone
over 35 as a new driver. This was not, as the defendant claimed,
a bona fide occupational qualification vitally linked to passenger
safety. Judge Parsons concluded:
I find, that a physical examination is no more valid a test of
driving ability for a 25 year old than for a 45 year old. Therefore,
I cannot utilize defendant's second reason as a criterion for deciding that a man of 25 would, merely by virtue of being 25, be
a safer driver than the man of 45. I cannot state with definitive
certainty that such physical examinations as are given would be
capable or incapable of discovering the physical and sensory
"I
changes common to all men ....
Greyhound had established its "no hire over 35" policy in 1928.
It contended that, as it was bound to exercise the highest degree
of care in protecting passenger safety, it could not hire men over
age 35, because they would be "extra board" drivers for 10-15
years before being promoted to a regular run. The court found,
however, that a number of men well over 40 were "extra board"
drivers, despite the alleged greater physical and mental strain of
this type of duty. Although Greyhound's own statistics showed
that the best driver safety record was compiled by a driver having
16 years experience, and operating a regular run, the company
171. Id. at 506.
172. Id. at 507.
173. 354 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1973), rev'd, 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1122 (1975). In reversing, the court of appeals held that the district court had
placed too heavy a burden of proof on Greyhound. Greyhound, the court held, need only
show it had a rational basis to believe its age restrictions decreased the risk of harm to
passengers. 499 F.2d at 863. Moreover, the company need only demonstrate a minimal
decrease in the risk of harm. Id. The court concluded that Greyhound had factually
established a valid bona fide occupational qualification defense to ADEA liability. Id. at
865.
174. 354 F. Supp. at 235.
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asserted that men over 40 could not acquire the necessary 16 years
driving experience within the usual period of time for employment. The court reviewed Greyhound's statistics, and concluded
they did not show a significant difference in accident rates for
drivers over or under age 40.171
The Greyhound court followed a pattern common enough in
Title VII Civil Rights Act litigation. It found the plaintiff had
made a prima facie case when he showed Greyhound refused to
hire drivers over age 35. Therefore, it required the defendant to
carry the burden of justifying its discriminatory activities on the
grounds that it was a bona fide occupational qualification.'
Greyhound adopted this rationale from Hodgson v. FirstFederal
Savings & Loan Association of Broward County,'77 a Wage-Hour
Division suit brought against a mammoth south Florida savings
and loan association to enjoin the Association from refusing to
hire two women over 40 as tellers. First Federal had 35 tellers, all
under 40. It refused to hire the two, otherwise qualified, allegedly
because they were too heavy. The Association tried to justify its
discrimination on objective factors, e.g., heavy women could not
stand up as long as slim ones. The Association lost. The court
extended a limited injunction restraining it from discriminating
against potential hirees over 40. The Labor Department appealed
loss of back wages for one hiree. In review, Judge Tuttle said:
In discrimination cases, the law with respect to burden of proof
is well settled. The plaintiff is requiredonly to make out a prima
facie case of unlawful discrimination at which point the burden
shifts to the defendant to justify the existence of any
disparities."I
This doctrine, adopted from Title VII litigation, requires the
plaintiff to show only the elements of a claim, whereupon the
defendant must show by a preponderance of evidence that the
discriminatory act was justified on some basis other than a
federally protected interest.17 1 In early 1974, therefore, an ADEA
plaintiff would most likely have to establish the existence of a
claim for relief by some competent evidence, thus forcing the
defendant to disprove the plaintiff's case by a preponderance of
the evidence.
175. Id. at 236-37.
176. Id. at 231-32.
177. 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
178. Id.at 822 (emphasis added).
179. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Robinson v. P. Lorrilard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th
Cir. 1971).
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It was unclear in 1974, however, whether a plaintiff had to
prove discrimination solely on the basis of age to establish a
prima facie ADEA case. In Schulz v. Hickok Manufacturing
Co., 80 plaintiff successfully established a prima facie case from
the depositions of another employee also discharged by Hickok.
The deponent was Theodore Saloman, who was fired October 28,
1970 by Hickok's national sales manager, Harry McLean.
McLean died in an airplane crash January 18, 1972. When Saloman was dismissed, McLean told him the reason for his discharge
was, "I don't know. Call it their youth movement."'' The plaintiff also offered statistical evidence which showed the average age
of the eight district managers for Hickok declined from 53.39
years to 40.75 years."2 The court held the defendant then had the
duty to rebut the plaintiff's case. The defendant introduced evidence showing that Schulz's poor divisional sales record led to his
discharge. That submission included McLean's evaluation of
Schulz, which stated Schulz's "[1]ack of mobility, energy and
enthusiasm over too long a period made development of sales
team very difficult."'8 " The court, however, thought McLean
probably made up the evaluation after Schulz had been discharged, because Schulz, when discharged, was told only that he
should "be doing more business," without further explanation by
his superiors."M Although Schulz's sales were dropping, the court
said that this evidence was insufficient to justify Schulz's discharge.'" The logical inference from Schulz was that if an employer discharges an employee by reason of his age, together with
other factors, the discharge is prima facie age discrimination.
2. The Laugesen Rule. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co.16 identified some of the elements required to prove a prima facie case of
liability under the ADEA. The plaintiff, Thor Laugesen, who was
discharged by Anaconda, was within the age group protected by
the ADEA. He elected to file suit and tried the case to a jury, who
decided for the defendant. Laugesen introduced into evidence a
personnel evaluation done on him prior to discharge which stated
that he "had too many years on the job."187 Laugesen's evidence
also included statistics that showed similar level supervisors were
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
Id. at 1212.
Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1216.
Id.
Id. at 1215-16.
510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 310-11.
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younger after the date of his discharge than at earlier selected
dates. Laugesen appealed to the Sixth Circuit, alleging a multitude of theoretical and evidentiary errors. Principally, he claimed
the district court erred by not instructing the jury that if they
found the plaintiff had made a prima facie case, the burden of
proof shifted to the defendant to disprove the plaintiff's case.118
The Sixth Circuit rejected Laugesen's theory, stating the Supreme Court did not have jury trials in mind when it decided the
burden of proof rules in McDonnell-Douglas Co. v. Green. "I The
plaintiff, in a jury trial on age discrimination in employment,
always had the burden of proof-unless the defendant admitted
liability-on all material issues. The trial court was right, said
the circuit judges, when it refused to tell the jury the defendant
0
had the burden of proving nondiscrimination.1
The trial judge, however, had instructed the jury that in
order to recover, Laugesen had to show he was discharged solely
because of age. This, the circuit judges said, was reversible error:
However expressed, we believe it was essential for the jury to
understand from the instructions that there could be more than
one factor in the decision to discharge him (Laugesen) and that
he was nevertheless entitled to recover if one such factor was his
age and if in fact it made a difference in determining whether
he was to be retained or discharged." I
Laugesen means that age must not be a factor in the decision to
discharge, limit, segregate, classify, refuse to hire, or refuse to
promote an employee. If age enters into the decision making process at any point, the decision is contrary to law.
3. The Rogers Rule. A second 1975 ADEA case attempted
to add significant concepts to the theory of relief. Rogers v. Exxon
Research & Engineering Co. "I appeared to be a garden variety
ADEA suit. The plaintiff, a 60-year-old research chemist, was
involuntarily retired by his employer, and claimed his retirement
constituted age discrimination. His employer said Rogers was
discharged because of mental instability. Dr. Rogers died during
litigation, and his spouse and daughter, who were substituted as
plaintiffs, 9 ' claimed actual damages for lost wages, liquidated
188. Id. at 312.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 313.
191. Id. at 317.
cert.
192. 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977),
(1978).
1022
U.S.
denied, 434
193. Id. at 336.
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damages, punitive damages, and damages for pain and suffering
arising from the mental distress of being let go. The plaintiff won
a jury verdict for $30,000 out-of-pocket lost salary and fringe benefits, and $750,000 for pain, suffering, and mental distress. The
defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. or, alternatively, a new
trial, was denied on condition plaintiff accept a remittitur of
$550,000 on the damages found for pain and suffering. Plaintiff
accepted the condition. "' Judge Stern wrote a special opinion
justifying his findings and rulings which plowed a new furrow in
ADEA theory:
It is the Court's view that the ADEA essentially establishes a
new statutory tort. Once liability is established under the statto
ute, therefore, the panoply of usual tort remedies is available
5
recompense injured partiesfor all provable damages."1
Judge Stern noted that Title VII litigation had recognized the
right of an injured party to receive compensatory damages for the
totality of harm caused by wrongful conduct.' Comparing the
ADEA with the Civil Rights Act of 1964,11 Judge Stern concluded
the greatest wrong done to an older worker was both invisible and
psychic, rather than economic:
In measuring the wrong done and ascertaining the appropriate
remedy here, the Court is aware that the most pernicious effect
of age discriminationis not to the pocketbook but to the victim's
self respect. As in this case, the out-of-pocket loss occasioned by
such discrimination is often negligible in comparison to the physiological and psychological damage caused by the employer's
unlawful conduct. 9 8
Judge Stern cited a number of cases decided under the Civil
Rights Act to support his conclusion that damages for pain and
suffering could be awarded in an ADEA case.' He also allowed
the plaintiff liquidated damages.2 0
The Rogers case was followed some months later by Bertrand
v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,2 0 in which Judge Decker of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois sustained plain194. Id. at 327.
195. Id. (emphasis added).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 328.
198. Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 332 (citing Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974) among
other cases, for authority).
200. Id. at 333-35.
201. 419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Il. 1976). See also Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 437 F.
Supp. 730 (D.S.C. 1977).
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tiff's claim to damages for pain and suffering as part of a claim
upon which relief can be had under the ADEA.'2" Judge Conti in
the District Court for the Northern District of California reached
23 3
the opposite result, however, in Sant v. Mack Trucks, Inc. 1 He
threw out the plaintiff's claim for damages from mental distress,
and pain and suffering, stating:
From a policy point of view, to allow recovery for pain and
suffering would transform the ADEA from an act that seeks to
eliminate and redress age discrimination to one for personalinjuries. . . .If large tort recoveries are allowable under the
ADEA, it is doubtful that alleged age discriminatees will enter
into good faith conference and conciliation when around the
comer lies the possibility of large dollar pain and suffering recoveries.2 0
Obviously Judge Conti was prescient. He knew that the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals would douse the flame lit by Rogers with
a good dose of conservatism.
In January, 1977, the Third Circuit doused Roger's flame
with a good dose of strict interpretation of supposed congressional policy. 2 5 The court decided that the ADEA did not make
a new tort, which permitted recovery for pain and suffering.
Judge Weiss's opinion stressed his interpretation of congressional
policy, which was to deter litigation by demanding potential litigants exhaust administrative relief before filing a lawsuit.ae
The thrust of the ADEA's remedy scheme, according to Judge
Weiss, is "that private lawsuits are secondary to administrative
2 s7
remedies and suits brought by the Department of Labor." A
private litigant's right to sue depends upon exhaustion of the
conciliation process. Judge Weiss was horrified that parties
might file ADEA suits to recover money damages not expressly
listed in the Fair Labor Standards Act as recoverable wage
claims:
An entitlement to an award for pain and suffering without
guidelines of any sort is a vague and amorphous concept traditionally found in a private lawsuit, but is uncommon in administrative actions. Certainly, if an award for such an intangible
were to be made in an administrative setting, statutory authorization or administrative regulations would be expected.20 8
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

419 F. Supp. at 1132-33.
424 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
550 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
Id. at 841.
Id.
Id. (citatioTis omitted).
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Judge Weiss also thought a claim for pain and suffering would
impair the conciliation process by introducing an element of uncertainty into the negotiating process. It would surely
"substantially increase the volume of litigation in the trial
courts. ' 20 9 He said Congress did not intend ADEA claimants to
recover for every wrong done to them as a proximate result of
employer age discrimination in employment.2 11 Therefore, the
court held the plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages for
pain and suffering was not a claim on which relief can be had,
and remanded the case for a new trial. Judge Weiss also pointed
out that Rogers's lawyers did not attempt conciliation through
the New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety, a
"jurisdictional defect" which normally would bar the suit, but
the circuit court, in its mercy, would not dismiss the suit for
want of jurisdiction.2 1' Thus, the brief career of Rogers is probably
the
over, unless the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals sustains
21 2
Co.
Exterminating
Orkin
v.
Bertrand
district court in
This synopsis of cases attempting to structure a remedy
theory for ADEA cases shows that winning a "nature of remedy"
case may indeed be to lose the fruits of victory in a morass.
Essentially, an aggrieved party who files a suit alleging discrimination by reason of age may recover lost wages, lost fringe benefits, and in case of a willful violation, liquidated damages. It is
not clear what elements the plaintiff has to prove, nor it it clear
what burden of proof the plaintiff carries. He might have a simple
requirement to submit some probative evidence thus forcing the
defendant to prove a rebuttal. On the other hand, the plaintiff
may have the traditional burden of proof requirements of an ordinary civil litigant.
B.

The Bona Fide Retirement Plan Defense

The bona fide retirement plan defense essentially is a device
similar to common law confession and avoidance. It allows an
employer to admit to forcibly discharging employees between the
ages of 40 and 64, thus denying the plaintiff the opportunity to
209. Id.
210. Id. at 840.
211. Id. at 843-44.
212. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois subsequently reaffirmed Bertrand, after the Third Circuit's reversal of Rogers. 432 F. Supp. 952
(N.D. Il. 1977). During the Rogers era, one district court apparently adopted the
Laugeson rule; in Cannaughton v. Monsanto, 423 F. Supp. 660 (E.D. Mo. 1976), the
defendant successfully rebutted the plaintiff's case by showing that age played no part in
Monsanto's decision to terminate the plaintiff.
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prove his case before the jury. It then permits the employer to
avoid the act by alleging the forcible retirement was "pursuant
to a seniority system or a bona fide employee benefit plan,"2' 3
excusing it from liability under the Act. Because "bona fide" is
a vague concept, the defense quickly prompted ADEA litigation
over the meaning of this defense. The ensuing litigation resulted
in a split of opinion among the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits,
Supreme Court decision in
resolved only by the United States
21
McMann v. United Airlines, Inc. 1
1. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co.21" The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals received the first chance to review this defense.
The Wage-Hour Division initiated a lawsuit against Taft Broadcasting on behalf of Rufus Jones." Taft bought WBRC-TV in
1957 and established a retirement plan which employees could
electively accept. The plan provided for mandatory retirement at
age 60 unless waived by the company. 217 In 1963, Jones elected to
participate in the plan and was retired June 1, 1970.1" Although
the Wage-Hour Division alleged Jones had been retired in violation of the ADEA, the Court of Appeals determined that Congress
never intended the ADEA to invalidate pre-existing retirement
programs requiring forcible retirement prior to age 65.211 The
Wage-Hour Division argued that the Taft Plan, essentially an
employee profit-sharing plan, was not the kind of plan insulated
by the "bona fide employee benefit plan" exception to ADEA
liability. The court, however, refused to accept the Wage-Hour
Division's contentions that the Internal Revenue Service definition of "employee benefit plan" should control the outcome under
the ADEA. It also rejected the Division's argument that the legislative history behind the Act supported the "no grandfather
clause" construction it urged on the court, 220 stating this was an
213. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1970) provided: "It shall not be unlawful for an employer
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system of any bona fide employee
benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge
to evade the purpose of this chapter." Section 623(f)(2) was amended in 1978. See 29
U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(2) (West Supp. 1978), and text accompanying notes 287-94 infra.
214. 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
215. 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 214.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 216-17.
220. Id. at 217. The Fourth Circuit subsequently accepted this argument in McMann.
The Secretary's position on the "grandfather clause" issue has not been consistent. Secretary of Labor Marshall now has readopted the position held by Secretary Brennan that
section 4(f) of the ADEA does not permit a preexisting retirement program to be a defense
to ADEA liability for forcible early retirement.
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attempt to override the plain meaning of the Act by reference to
legislative history, an ingenious argument after the long interpretative argument the court presented in justification of its result.
The majority concluded that the plaintiff ought to lose; because
plan,
Jones would receive at least $15,000 under the profit 2sharing
2
the plan, in their collective wisdom, was bona fide.
Judge Tuttle dissented, arguing the Taft Plan never became
a "bona fide employee benefit plan" within the meaning of section 4(f) of the ADEA. He quoted the following provision from the
plan:
The normal retirement date of each Participant is the June 1 on
which he has reached age 60. A Participant retiring from employment with the company on his normal retirement date is
deemed retired under the Plan as of such date.m
This, he said, did not amount to compulsory termination at age
60. The summary of benefits provided Jones in 1963 did not state
he would be forcibly retired at age 60; 23 in fact, it stated that later
retirement was optional with the employee. Judge Tuttle then
concluded:
My second ground for disagreement is that, even though Jones
were to be held to have been fully bound by the purported plan
because of his application, even though he was misled as to its
critical terms, the plan as fully spelled out still does not have
the effect contended for it by the Company, or as found for it
by the court ...
. . .[A]t the very least . . . such plan must state in cate-

gorical terms that its members are subject to compulsory retirement at a time or under conditions differing from those of the
2
statute . 2
Judge Tuttle's dissent oscillated between the theory that Jones
was deceived when he joined the plan, and the theory that if he
was not deceived, it was because the plan did not provide for
manadatory retirment at age 60 as the company suggested. In
either case, Jones was entitled to a new trial.2 5
221. Id.

222. Id. at 218.
223. Id. at 218-19.
224. Id. at 220.
225. Id. For three years following Brennan, no court of appeals had an opportunity
to review the bona fide retirement plan defense. Consequently, Brennan was cited to
sustain a forced early retirement in Steiner v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 377 F. Supp. 945 (C.D. Cal. 1974). The National League plan called for an "early
out" at fifty-five for all officials, with a proviso permitting retention at the league's option
after fifty-five. The League refused Steiner's request to be retained after age fifty-five.
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2. Zinger v. Blanchette. The Third Circuit reviewed the
bona fide retirement plan exception in Zinger v. Blanchette"' in
early 1977. The plaintiff, an employee of the Penn-Central Railroad, was retired at age 64, which cost him $834.12 in annual
retirement benefits. The Penn-Central pension plan, originally
the 1938 Pennsylvania Railroad plan, antedated the ADEA by
nearly 30 years and granted the company the right to retire any
employee between age 60 and 65. The receiver for the railroad
admitted the discharge was discriminatory, but claimed the
Penn-Central retirement program was a "bona fide retirement
plan" exempt from statutory liability. The Third Circuit rejected
the Brennan automatic "grandfather clause" concept,2 but felt,
however, that the Act contemplated a difference between discharge and retirement. The court reviewed testimony before the
1967 Senate Committee on Aging, the bulletin of the Secretary
of Labor interpreting the ADEA,28 and the 1975 Labor Department report to Congress. Ultimately the panel concluded that the
Penn-Central system was bona fide, because both sides agreed it
was so;2 9 thus the plan was insulated from ADEA attack. In

essence, Zinger stands for the proposition that any "involuntary
retirement pursuant to a bona fide plan that is not a subterfuge
• . .is not unlawful," whether or not the plan predates the
ADEA.
3. McMann v. United Airlines, Inc.: Reinstating the
Grandfather Clause. Harris McMann was hired by United Airlines in 1944 as a flight officer. At the time he was hired, United's
retirement program, initiated in 1941,2 1 set normal retirement
age for employees in the plan at age 60.32 Although participation
Steiner notified the Wage-Hour Division as required by section 7 of the Act, and commenced suit. He lost his case squarely on the notion that the league's retirement program
pre-dated the ADEA, and was therefore valid. Id. at 948. A number of district courts
accepted this result during 1975-77, the last being Raymond v. Bendix Corp., 15 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 49 (1977), decided by the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiff was
involuntarily retired at fifty-six by Bendix under a forced early retirement program. He
filed the requisite notice of intention to sue, and commenced an action against Bendix
for reinstatement and back pay. Bendix admitted the discharge, but defended its retirement program as a "bona fide retirement program." Id. at 51. The court reviewed the
bewildering array of decisions under the bona fide retirement plan defense, and denied
defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to
present evidence to show the plan was not bona fide. Id. Bendix, however, had amended
its pre-1967 plan in 1969 by lowering the early involuntary retirement age from 60 to 55.
226. 549 F.2d 901 (3rd Cir. 1977).
227. Id. at 904-05.
228. 29 C.F.R. § 860.110 (1977).
229. 549 F.2d at 909-10.
230. Id. at 910.
231. McMann v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217, 218-19 (4th Cir. 1976).
232. Id. at 219.
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was voluntary, McMann joined the program in 1964. In 1973,
McMann turned 60 and was retired. McMann filed a notice of
intent to sue with the Labor Department, followed in due course
by suit in district court for reinstatement and back pay under the
ADEA. 331 Both McMann and United moved for summary judgment. United alleged that McMann was retired pursuant to a
bona fide retirement plan that was not a subterfuge.2 u The district court granted United's motion, and McMann appealed to
the Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit initially found the plan bona fide on its
face, because it existed and paid some benefit to McMann.23 5 The
court then reviewed United's plan to see whether it was a subterfuge. It determined that section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA existed to
promote hiring older workers, not to permit the discharge of older
workers before age 65 through forced early retirement.23 ' The
court also held that the meaning of "normal retirement age,"
according to the United plan, was to provide for mandatory early
retirement at age 60, although United reserved the right to continue its employees after that date, thus making the early out
program mandatory rather than optional.217
At this point, United invited the Fourth Circuit to follow
Brennan's lead and hold its plan insulated from attack because
it predated 1967, but the court refused to accept this position. It
233. United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 194 (1977).
234. The facts were stipulated by the parties. Id. at 193.
235. "It is conceded that the plan is 'bona ide' in the sense that it exists and pays
benefits. United presented no evidence, however, to show that the provision of its plan
requiring retirement at age 60 had any purpose other than arbitrary age discrimination."
542 F.2d at 219.
236. Id. at 220-21. The court continued:
Stated otherwise, there must be some reason other than age, for a plan, or a
provision of a plan, which discriminates between employees of different ages.
At this stage of the proceedings, United has offered no non-arbitrary justification for the age 60 retirement provisions in its plan.
Any other reading of the "subterfuge" clause would produce the absurd
result that an employer could discharge an employee pursuant to a retirement
plan for no reason other than age, but then could not refuse to rehire the presumptively otherwise qualified individual, for 29 U.S.C. section 623(f)(2) explicitly provides that "no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire
any individual."
Id. at 220.
237. While the meaning of the word "normal" in this context is not free
from doubt, counsel agreed in oral argument [that] . . . [tihe employee has
no discretion whether to continue beyond the normal retirement age. . ..
Given these facts, we conclude that for purposes of this decision, the plan should
be regarded as one requiring retirement at age 60 rather than one permitting it
at the option of the employer.
Id. at 219.
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held that refusing to retain McMann was tantamount to refusing
to hire him or any other person over age 60.23 Thus, the plan was
a "subterfuge" within the meaning of section 4(f)(2) of the Act,
and the case was remanded to the district court for appropriate
findings. 231 The airline applied for and was granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court voted 7 to 2 to reverse the Fourth Circuit. 2 0 Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion in which
four other Justices (Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens) concurred. Justices Stewart and White concurred in the judgment,
each writing a separate opinion. Justices Marshall and Brennan
dissented. To understand the decision, each set of opinions requires close examination.
Chief Justice Burger first dealt with McMann's contention
that "normal retirement age" does not mean mandatory retirement age, which would permit him to continue as an employee
after age 60. Chief Justice Burger rejected this argument, and
followed the Fourth Circuit which held it to be a mandatory
retirement program for persons at age 60.21 The majority then
dealt with McMann's contention, accepted by the Fourth Circuit,
that Congress never intended section 4(f)(2) to authorize involuntary retirement before age 65. McMann, arguing from the Congressional Record, had convinced the Fourth Circuit that the section was intended to make it economically feasible for employers
238. Id. at 221.
United rests on the Brennan court's conclusion that any action required by a
plan predating the act is valid, since such a plan could never be a subterfuge.
While we have already pointed out the fallacy in this reasoning, it is also refuted
by the legislative history. The report states that the exemption "applies to new
and existing employee benefit plans, and to both the establishment and maintenance of such plans." It is difficult to reconcile this language with a construction
of the statute which would treat new and existing plans differently, automatically validating the provision of existing plans by refusing to inquire into their
purpose. In addition, the legislative history makes it clear that the maintenance
of a discriminatory plan is to be considered independently under this exemption.
An employer must demonstrate that a plan is not being maintained as a subterfuge to evade the Act, as well as showing benign establishment, in order to
prevail.
d. at 221-22.
239. Id. at 222-23.
240. 434 U.S. at 204.
241. Id. at 196. The United States Labor Department also adopted a position which
paralleled this result. "The fact than an employer may decide to permit certain employees
to continue working beyond the age stipulated in the formal retirement program does not,
in and of itself, render an otherwise bona fide plan invalid insofar as the exception provided in section 4(f)(2) is concerned." 29 C.F.R. § 860.110(a) (1975). The 1975 Annual
Report of the Department, however, apparently contradicts this statement, because it
states that early retirements are unlawful unless the retirement plan mandates all personnel retire early.
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to hire older workers, not to condone forced early retirement.2 2
First, Chief Justice Burger stated that resorting to legislative
intent in order to interpret section 4(f)(2) was unnecessary because the statute was unambiguous.113 He then argued alternatively that legislative intent actually showed the contrary position because "[sjuch a pervasive impact on bona fide existing
plans should not be read into the Act without a clear, unambiguous expression in the statute." ' He referred to Senate subcommittee hearings on the original proposed version of section 4(0(2)
for authority that the Labor Department thought both the original and the final versions of the section insulated pre-existing
plans from attack.2 4 5 He quoted a lengthy remark by Senator
Javits made during committee hearings, later quoted by Justice
Marshall's dissent, to prove his point. The quotation, to say the
least, was marginally helpful to the majority. The Chief Justice
then cited the AFL-CIO's testimony during committee hearings
to prove the original version of section 4(0(2) did not prevent
forcible early retirement by employers. Because the proposed
AFL-CIO amendment to section 4(f)(2) was not adopted, Chief
Justice Burger concluded that Congress intended its revised version of the original section to insulate earlier plans from attack.
The purpose of revising the original section was to protect older
workers who were hired and not to protect existing workers. He
then concluded:
[W]e do not pass on the wisdom of fixed mandatory retirements at a particular age. So limited, we find nothing to indicate Congress intended wholesale invalidation of retirement
plans instituted in good faith before its passage or intended to
require employers to bear the burden of showing a business or
economic purpose to justify bona fide preexisting plans ....
[A] plan established in 1941, if bona fide, as conceded here,
cannot be a subterfuge to evade an Act passed 26 years later.2
The threat to the ADEA posed by this conclusion is obvious; by
resurrecting the "impairment of contract" doctrine, the Court
has made this a constitutional case.
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, although short, con242. 434 U.S. at 198.
243. Id. at 199.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 199-200. The Chief Justice, in a sarcastic footnote, further stated,
"[ilegislative observations 10 years after passage of the Act are in no sense part of the
legislative history." Id. at 200 n.7. This refers to Justice Marshall's citation of 1977 Congressional debate on the meaning of section 4(f)(2) in his dissent.
246. Id. at 203.

64

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 2:15

tains one significant point. He stated that the only issue in the
case was whether or not the United plan was a subterfuge. He said
it was not legally possible for a pre-1967 retirement plan to be a
subterfuge, and therefore would not deal2 7with the issues discussed
by the majority and by Justice White.
Justice White, in a concurring opinion, differed with the majority opinion on the ground that the question of "subterfuge"
had to be decided under section 4(f)(2) of the Act with respect to
any pre-existing retirement plan. Justice White said the decision
not to change the pre-1967 plan in 1968 or thereafter had to be
examined separately: "[tihere is no magic in the fact that
United's retirement plan was adopted prior to the Act, for not
establishment, but also its maintenance must be
only the plan's
4,2 8
scrutinized.
He felt the issue was whether the ADEA prohibited mandatory retirement pursuant to a bona fide retirement plan, and
concluded the Act did not do so. Justice White found the United
4' but
plan bona fide in so far as it paid benefits to McMann,
rejected the Fourth Circuit's view that the "no subterfuge" requirement was a separate ground for invalidating early retirement programs. He concluded by saying that he found no indication from the record that the United plan was not bona fide; if it
paid substantial benefits it was bona fide and beyond attack,
whether or not it pre-dated 1967.20 He then rejected the majority
opinion's grandfather clause argument.
Dissenting, Justice Marshall first found the provisions of sec2 51
tion 4(f)(2) of the ADEA to be ambiguous, therefore in need of
construction. Justice Marshall noted the similarity in structure
between the ADEA and the Civil Rights Act of 1964,22 and he
paralleled section 4(f)(2) to section 703 of the Civil Rights Act,
which forbids involuntary retirement because of race, sex, national origin, or religion .253 If Congress adopted identical language
in both sections, he stated, then section 4(f)(2) means that under
247. Id. at 204.
248. Id. at 205. Although the author disagrees with Justice White's conclusion that
United's plan paid the type of "substantial benefits" the ADEA drafters intended as a
substitution for full employment, Justice White clearly understood the issues and refused
to fall for the "grandfather clause" position of the majority. His analysis clearly expounds
the choices to be made. One would wish that summary judgment would have been denied,
and the cause remanded for a trial on the issue of the "bona fides" of the United plan.
249. Id. at 206-07.
250. Id. at 207-08.
251. Id. at 209.
252. Id. at 209 n.2.
253. Id. at 208-09.
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the ADEA forced retirement is tantamount to discharge.25 4

Justice Marshall found two possible meanings for section
4(f)(2). First, it could be read to permit involuntary retirement
of employees age 40-64 if they receive retirement benefits. Second, he adopted an alternative view, which states the section only
authorizes employers to pay lesser benefits to older employees
whom they hire at a later than average age. He stated the crucial
issue is choosing between these alternative meanings: "We need
not decide on a strictly grammatical basis which reading is preferable. We are judges, not linguists, and our task is to divine con2 5
gressional intent using all available evidence.

1

The majority, he said, found that the primary purpose of the
Act was to facilitate hiring older workers. Rejecting the majority
and Justice White's reliance on legislative history relating to
amendments not passed by Congress, Justice Marshall quoted
the original draft version of section 4(f)(2) and compared it to the
present Act, which deletes the specific authorization for forcible
early retirement in the original draft.25 1 Justice Marshall argued

this meant Congress did not intend to insulate pre-existing plans.
Justice Marshall also returned to Chief Justice Burger's quotation of the exchange between Senators Javits and Yarborough
over the purpose of section 4(f)(2),2 57 concluding that in no way
254. Id. Justice Marshall identified possible positions that can be taken on the meaning of section 4(f)(2). He did not agree with Justice White that section 4(f)(2) of ADEA
permitted forced early retirement before 65. That was, of course, a question of fact, to
which McMann's lawyers were willing to stipulate in the district court. Id. at 193.
255. Id. at 210.
256. There can be no question that had Congress enacted § 4(0(2) in the
form in which it was proposed by the Administration, forced retirement would
be permissible. That section of the initial bill quite specifically allowed such
retirement. It provided: "It shall not be unlawful for an employer ...
to separate involuntarily an employee under a retirement policy or system where such
policy or system is not merely a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this
Act ....
Id. at 211.
This original version was ambiguous, and the subsequent redraft of section 4(0(2)
eliminated the objection raised by Sen. Javits and quoted by Chief Justice Burger.
Present section 4(f)(2), while vague about "observing the terms of a bona fide seniority
system. . . or pension plan," at least provides an answer to the question proposed by Sen.
Javits-can someone be involuntarily retired because of any provision in the plan mandating retirement before 65? The answer in section 4(f)(2) as enacted is no!
257. Id. at 211-13. The Chief Justice cited a portion of this exchange in a footnote.
The entire exchange reads as follows:
MR. JAvrrs: The meaning of this provision is as follows: an employer will not
be compelled under this section to afford to older workers exactly the same
pension, retirement or insurance benefits as he affords to younger workers. If the
older worker chooses to waive all of those provisions, then the older worker can
obtain the benefits of this act, but the older worker cannot compel an employer
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did Congress suggest that the exemption in the section permitted
involuntary retirement.
Finally, Justice Marshall pointed out that McMann, although forcibly retired at age 60, could not be refused a new
5
position by United if he applied, and otherwise was qualified.2
Such a result cannot be defended logically, he suggested. Justice
Marshall also noted that at the time of the decision, both the
Senate and the House were considering clarifying amendments to
section 4 (f)( 2 )2" to prevent the construction reached in Brennan
through the use of this act to undertake some special relationship, course or
other condition with respect to a retirement, pension, or insurance plan which
is not merely a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the act-and we understand
that-in order to give that older employee employment on the same terms as
others. I would like to ask the manager of the bill whether he agrees with that
interpretation, because I think it is very necessary to make its meaning clear to
both employers and employees ...
my underMR.YARBOROUGH: I wish to say to the Senator that that is basically
(f)
subsection
2,
clause
bill,
the
of
20
page
22,
standing of the provision of line
of section 4, when it refers to retirement, pension, or insurance plan, it means
that a man who would not have been employed except for this law does not have
to receive the benefits of the plan. Say an applicant for employment is 55, comes
in and seeks employment, and the company has bargained for a plan with its
labor union that provides certain moneys will be put up for a pension plan for
anyone who worked for the employer for 20 years so that a 55 year old employee
would not be employed past 10 years. This means he cannot be denied employment because he is 55, but he will not be able to participate in that pension plan
because unlike a man hired at 44, he has no chance to earn 20 years retirement.
In other words, this will not disrupt the bargained for pension plan. This will
not deny any individual employment or prospective employment but will limit
his rights to obtain full consideration in the pension, retirement or insurance
plan.
MR. JAvrrS: I thank my colleage. That is important to business.
113 CONG. RIc. 31,255 (1967). This also appears at 434 U.S. at 214-15.
258. Of course, one may legitimately argue that the purpose of ADEA would be served
if McMann was rehired on a year to year basis without accruing retirement benefits at
his former highly expensive rate. High retirement program costs account for part of the
push to retire workers before 65.
sev259. 434 U.S. at 218. The House and Senate amendments originally differed in
respects:
eral
HOUSE AMENDMENTS

HR 5383

SENATE AMENDMENTS

HOUSE PROPOSAL (H. R. 5383)

SENATE VERSION AFTER AMENDING

Section 1. This act may be cited
as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1977.

Section 1. That this act may be
cited as the "Age Discrimination
in Employment Amendments of
1977."

Section 2. (a) Paragraph (2) of
section 4(f) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
is
(2)
(29 U.S.C. 623(f)(1))

Section 2. (a) Section 4(f) (1) of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 623
(f)(1)) is amended by inserting
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v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 260 and by the majority opinion.2'

4. Analysis of McMann. Clearly, all three sets of opinions
turned on two conditions: (1) section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA is vague
or ambiguous, and (2) congressional intent at the time the Act
was adopted determined the outcome of the case. This is true
despite Chief Justice Burger's disclaimer that section 4(f)(2) was
amended by inserting after "individual" the following: "and except
that the involuntary retirement of
any such seniority system or any
such employee benefit plan because
of the age of such employee."

after "section" a comma and the
following: "Including the establishment of a mandatory retirement age less than the maximum
age specified in section 12 of the
Act."

(b) The amendment made by
subsection (a) shall take effect immediately upon the date of enactment. Provided, that in the case of
employees covered by a bona fide
collective bargaining agreement in
effect at least 30 days prior to the
date of enactment of this Act entered into by a labor organization
(as defined in section 6(d) (4) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 as amended) the amendment
made by subsection (a) shall take
effect in such a case where the
provisions of such collectively bargained agreement would be prohibited, as a result of the amendment to section (12) (a) (2) of the
Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 made by section 4(b)
of this Act upon the termination of
such agreement or upon the expiration of two years from the date of
the enactment of this act, whichever shall first occur.

(b) Section 4(f)(2) of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 623(f) (2) is
amended by inserting after "individual" a comma and the following: "and no such seniority system
or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified
by section 12 of this act because
of the age of such employee."

123 Cong. Rec. H 9,967 (daily ed.
Sept. 23, 1977)

(c) The amendments made by
subsections (a) and (b) of this
Act, except that in case of employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement which is in effect on September 1, 1977, entered
into by a labor organization (as
defined by section 6(d) (4) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938),
and which would otherwise be prohibited by the amendment made
by section 3 of this Act, the amendment made by subsection (b) shall
take effect upon the termination of
such agreement or January 1, 1980
whichever occurs first.
123 Cong. Rec. S 17,272 (daily ed.
Oct. 19, 1977)

The differences in nuance between the two versions appear to be syntactic rather than
substantive. The final version of the 1978 Amendments followed the Senate version. H.R.
RFP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-15, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1009.
260. 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying notes 215-25 supra.
261. It was this statement that Chief Justice Burger alluded to in his opinion. However, some of the original sponsors of the 1967 Act were those making the loudest objection
to the Fifth Circuit holding in Brennan.
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unambiguous. What is not clear from any of the opinions is how
much thought the Court gave to the results of their decision. At
the same time the Court heard argument in this case, Congress
was debating major changes to the ADEA, including an amendment to overturn the results in both Brennan and Zinger." Justice Marshall alone notes this significant development. To understand McMann and its impact on the future of anti-age discrimination law in the United States, the legal technicalities and the
likely social impact of the thinking behind the decision need to
be exposed.
a. Technical Analysis. Section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA is not
clear on its face, and can be understood only within the context
of the entire ADEA and the history of its formulation and adoption. The structure of section 4(f) provides the clearest source of
internal support for McMann. The section lists three general exceptions to the rule barring-age discrimination in employment:
(a) observation of bona fide occupational qualifications, (b) discharge on reasonable factors other than age, and (c) observation
of a bona fide seniority or benefit plan which is not a subterfuge.M
All three subsections are confession and avoidance defenses to
ADEA liability, and must be read in conjunction with the Act's
general purposes. The purposes of the Act may be extracted from
the legislative history as well as from the declaration of purpose
in the Act itself.
b. Legislative History. Legislative history confirms Justice
White's interpretation of section 4(0(2). The original committee
report explained section 4(0(2) in the following language:
Subsection (0 contained exceptions to the foregoing provisions
It also provides that it will not be unlawful
of this section ....
to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona
fide employee benefit plan, except that no employee benefit
plan may excuse the failure to hire any individual.
262. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REc. S17,274 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Sen.
Williams). Sen. Williams states:
Since enactment and despite this clear expression of our intent, the courts have
disagreed over the interpretation of this section. . . . Section 4(f)(2) was intended to permit and will continue to permit varying coverage of workers in
different age groups to reflect those differences so long as they are based on valid
assumptions and applied in a non-discriminatory manner.
Because some courts have not properly interpreted the meaning of this
section the committee acted to clarify our original intention. The amendment
to section 4(f)(2) forbids mandatory retirement required by a pension or other
employee benefit plan or seniority system and serves to express congressional
approval of the result reached by the fourth circuit in McMann.
263. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1970).
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• . . It is important to note that exception (3) (section
4(f)(2)) applies to new and existing employee benefit plans and
to both the establishment and maintenance of such plans. This
exception serves to emphasize the primary purpose of the
bill-hiring of older workers-by permitting employment without necessarily including such workers in employee benefit
plans. The specific exception was an amendment to the original
bill, is considered vital to the legislation, and was favorably
received by witnesses at the hearing." '
The report accords with later Senate floor debate in which Senator Yarborough explained the provisions of section 4(f)(2) as
adopted by the committee.6 5
Further, Senator Javits reflected the consensus of the bill's
sponsors in the following remarks from the congressional debate
on the bill:
The amendment relating to seniority systems and employee
benefit plans is particularly significant: because of it an employer will not be compelled to afford older workers exactly the
same pension, retirement or insurance benefits as younger workers and thus employers will not, because of the often extremely
high cost of providing certain types of benefits to older workers,
actually be discouraged from hiring older workers. At the same
time, it should be clear that this amendment only relates to the
observance of bona fide plans. No such plan will help an employee if it is adopted merely as a subterfuge for discriminating
against older workers."'
Following this statement, Senator Javits repeated a question
raised earlier in the debate by Senator Dirksen relating to the
meaning of the exemption for seniority or benefit plans. Senator
Javits answered this rhetorical question:
The meaning of the provision is as follows: An employer will not
be compelled under this section to afford to older workers exactly the same pension, retirement, or insurance benefits as he
affords to younger workers. If the older worker chooses to waive
all of those provisions, then the older worker can obtain the
benefits of this act, but the older worker cannot compel an employer through the use of this act to undertake some special
relationship, course, or other condition with respect to a retirement, pension, or insurance plan which is not merely a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the act-and we understand
264. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 4, 9, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2213, 2217, 2222.
265. 113 CONG. REc. 31,255 (1967).
266. Id. at 31,254-55.
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that-in order to give that older employee employment on the
7
same terms as others.2
This statement was followed by the exchange between Senators
Javits and Yarborough quoted by the majority opinion and by
Justice Marshall's dissent in support of their divergent observations.2 8
Likewise, the House floor debate indicated a similar understanding of section 4(f)(2).169 In fact, the remarks of Representative Dent during floor debate restate the committee report issued
by the Senate three weeks earlier: "It is important to note that
exception (3) (section 4(f)(2)) applies to new and existing employee benefit plans, and to both the establishment and maintenance of such plans."' 0 Because nothing in either the committee
report or in floor debate in both Houses shows Congress intended
to create a "grandfather clause" exception for pre-existing retirement plans, the majority of the Supreme Court created such an
exception out of gossamer, and took a stance clearly contrary to
the interpretation placed on this provision by Congress itself.2'
In the 1977 debate relating to amendments to the ADEA, several
Congressmen and Senators repeated the thoughts expressed in
1967. Representative Cohen stated the issue most effectively:
I am particularly pleased that this bill seeks to clarify the section of the ADEA which provides an exemption "to observe the
terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan." In making this
provision, the Congress attempted to avoid a problem that was
foreseen during the hearings and investigations ...
employers were required to enroll other workers in
. . .If
pension plans or group health insurance programs, it was anticipated that costs for such plans would greatly increase, discouraging employers from providing them. In order to avoid placing
undue hardship on employers, it was the intent of Congress to
permit the hiring of older workers without requiring that they
be fully included in company employee benefit plans. This exemption was designed to encourage the hiring of older workers
without bankrupting pension plans.
267. Id. at 31,255.
268. Id. See note 257 supra for text of colloquy.
269. See 113 CONG. REC. 34,740, 34,746 (1967).
270. Id. at 34,747.
271. Senators Javits and Williams, and Rep. Wampler in debating current amendments to ADEA expressly note that the results in Zinger and Taft Broadcasting Co. are
inconsistent with the original intent of the 1967 ADEA. See 123 CONG. Rc. S17,274 (daily
ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at S17,297 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977)
(remarks of Sen. Javits); id. at H9,353 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1977) (remarks of Rep.
Wampler).
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While there was absolutely no intention to allow this exemption to legalize involuntary retirement before age 65, this is
what has occurred through interpretations by both the Labor
Department and the courts."'
Consequently, it is hard to accept the majority opinion's conclusion that no express intent to legalize involuntary early retirement amounted to a confession that it was legal.
VI.

THE 1978 AMENDMENTS: THEIR IMPACT AND A PREDICTION
A.

CongressionalBackground

Early in the 1977 session of Congress, Senator Javits introduced a set of comprehensive amendments to the ADEA.2 Senator Javits, of course, had been one of the prime movers behind
the original 1967 version of the ADEA. The Javits bill proposed
the abolition of mandatory retirement for nearly all American
workers by 1985. The bill also called for technical revisions to the
Act in two critical areas: the bona fide retirement plan exemption, and the "notice is condition precedent to suit" doctrine.
Senate Hearings on the Javits bill led to a Senate Human Resources Committee bill that imposed a number of special-interest
limitations on the blanket abolition of mandatory retirement.2
At the same time, the House was preparing its own technical
amendments to the ADEA 5 sponsored by Representative Claude
Pepper. Although both bills contained similar provisions changing the upper limit for mandatory retirement, the House and
Senate bills were poles apart on technical measures to cure the
defects in the ADEA previously noted in this article."6
272. Id. at H9,354 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Cohen).
273. Id. at S17,275-77 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Javits); H.R. REP.
No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-15, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws

1000.
274. S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-34, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.

& AD. Nws 976.
275. H.R. 5383, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG. REc. H9967 (daily ed. Sept. 23,

1977).
276. H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-15, reprinted in [1978] U.S.

CODE

CONG. & AD. NEws 1000, reveals that:

1) The House offered technical amendments to section 4(f)(2) to overrule
McMann v. United Airlines, Inc., resembling the Senate version eventually

receded to by the House.
2) The Senate proposed: (a) technical amendments to section 4(f)(2) which were
eventually adopted by the conference committee, together with technical
amendments to section 4(0(1) redefining bona fide occupational qualification,
which was dropped by the conferees; (b) technical amendments to sections 7(d)
and (e) confirming certain equitable exceptions to the "notice is jurisdictional"
doctrine, and (c) confirmation of jury trial rights under ADEA.
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On September 23, 1978, the House passed H.R. 5383 and sent
it to the Senate."' On October 19, the Senate passed an amendment in substitution for H.R. 5383 which incorporated most of the
provisions on the proposed Senate bill." 8 There was considerable
floor debate in both Houses relating to the raising of mandatory
retirement for non-federal workers to age 70, and specific exemptions for highly paid executives and college professors from this
provision."' Some consideration was given to the bona fide retirement plan escape clause in both Senate and House debates.
The Senate and House versions then were committed to a conference committee for a horse-trading session for the exact text of
the new law. The conference committee report returned to the
House and Senate March 14, 1978. Both Houses passed the resulting compromise bill on April 6 and sent it to the President for
signature on April 8, 1978.
The resulting law followed in most respects the Senate version with very few exceptions. It incorporated major policy
changes in addition to correcting technical deficiencies in the
ADEA. The following analysis will deal first with technical
changes, and second with the impact of raising the mandatory
retirement age for American workers to age 70.
B.

The Technical Changes to ADEA

Considering the dismal history of ADEA enforcement at the
hands of an understaffed and over-worked Department of Labor
Wage-Hour Division, and the equally disappointing results of private ADEA suits for reinstatement, back pay and damages, the
technical corrections Congress provided were relatively narrow in
scope. Congress generally exercised its prerogative to overrule
specific cases it found hostile to its original intent in approving
the 1967 ADEA, and did little more.
1. Jury Trial Rights Under the ADEA. In order of importance, the least significant technical change was the amendment
introduced by Senator Kennedy on the Senate floor clarifying the
jury trial rights of plaintiffs in ADEA suits. Agreed to without
277. 123 CONG. Rac. H9984 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1977).
278. Id. at S17,303 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977).
279. See, e.g., id. at H9954-55, 9957 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Warnpier); id. at S17,282 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Pell); id. at S17,286-88
(daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Chaffee and Sen. Hayakawa); id. at S17,28991 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
280. See, e.g., id. at H9975-76 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1977) (remarks of Mr. Drinan); id.
at S17,273 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
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vote, Senator Kennedy's amendment modified section (7)(c) of
the ADEA by providing that:
In an action brought under paragraph (1) a person shall be
entitled to a trial by jury of any issue of fact in any such action
for recovery of amounts owing as a result of a violation of this
Act, regardless of whether equitable relief is sought by any party
in such action.291
Prior case law on the right to a jury trial under the ADEA was
divided on the nature and extent of jury trial rights. In Morelock
v. NCR Corp.,2 the Sixth Circuit denied the plaintiff's jury trial
demand, holding that the ADEA limits damages to back pay, and
the scope of remedies offered thereafter becomes primarily equitable in nature. Therefore, the court reasoned that a claim for
reinstatement and back pay was not a seventh amendment jury
trial claim.2 The Supreme Court in Lorrilardv. Ponsm may have
disposed of a portion of the Morelock decision because the Court
held that a claim for back wages, coupled with reinstatement,
presented a seventh amendment jury trial issue.2 The amendment proposed by Senator Kennedy, and adopted by the conference committee, tries to alter the application of traditional jury
trial right doctrine m to ADEA suits by mandating that legal and
equitable claims (before 1978) presented by an ADEA suit will be
jury trial issues by right. Because the issue is interpretation of the
seventh amendment, the Kennedy proviso has a fair chance ei281. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(c)(2) (West Supp. 1978).
282. 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 65 (6th Cir. 1976).
283. Id. at 66-68. "Appellant's action in this case is basically for reinstatement and
injunctive relief. Such an action necessarily invokes the broad powers of the court and is
necessarily equitable in nature .
Id.
I."
284. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
285. Id. at 582-83.
286. The normal rule for determining when an issue is justiciable by the jury is
whether or not the action may be characterized as having been, prior to 1789, the type of
suit which would have merited a jury trial at common law.
The difficulty in applying the normal seventh amendment approach to wage hour
claims and to ADEA claims results from the nature of the relief sought. First, reinstatement with back pay is relief unknown to the common law. Second, reinstatement is a
command to someone to perform a specific act under pain of contempt; thus an award of
back pay consequent on reinstatement looks more like equitable compensation than
money damages.
On the other hand, claims for liquidated damages, for pain and suffering, and for
mental distress proximately caused by the civil wrong of arbitrary age discrimination in
employment, resemble common law claims for money damages. The Supreme Court's
decision in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) helped to clarify this area somewhat. It
is now clear that an ADEA claim for back pay and reinstatement presents a jury trial
issue. In Lorillard, the Court expressly declined to determine the right to jury trial on a
liquidated damages claim. d. at 577 n.2.
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ther of being held to violate the seventh amendment or of being
whittled down to the limited scope of Pons. Frankly, it is rather
difficult to find a legal justification for the Kennedy amendment.
Morelock was wrongly decided, but the Supreme Court rectified
Morelock in Pons, and the full reach of traditional seventh
amendment jury trial rights now extends to the legal portion of a
claim for "money damages" under the ADEA and section 16 of
the FLSA.
2. Bona Fide Retirement Plan Escape Clause. The second
technical amendment put into the 1978 amendments attempted
to overrule United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann. Congress amended
section 4(f)(2) of the 1967 ADEA with respect to bona fide retirement plans by providing that "no such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section 12(a) of this Act be' 7
cause of the age of such individual." The impact of the amendment, however, is limited by a proviso that "grandfathers" involuntary retirement programs created by labor organization collective bargaining efforts before September 1, 1977. These programs
may continue until the termination of the current collective barfirst.2
gaining agreement or January 1, 1980, whichever occurs
McMann held that an involuntary retirement program which
predated the effective date of the ADEA, and which permitted or
required involuntary retirement of participating members before
age 65, was immune from the effect of the Act.28 Justice White's
concurring opinion limited the decision to the "bona fide" aspect
of the United Air Lines retirement program, which2 he believed
had been established by the defendant in the case. 90
The conference committee adopted the Senate language for
this amendment.29 1 The conference committee report states that
287. 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(2) (West Supp. 1978).

288.
(b) The amendment made by subsection (a) of this section shall take effect
on the date of enactment of this Act ...,except that, in the case of employees
covered by a collective bargaining agreement which is in effect on September
1, 1977, which was entered into by a labor organization (as defined by section
(6)(d)(4) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. . .) and which would otherwise be prohibited by the amendment made by section 3(a) of this Act, the
amendment made by subsection (a) of this section . . .shall take effect upon
the termination of such agreement, or on January 1, 1980, whichever first occurs.

Id.
289. 434 U.S. at 203.
290. Id. at 207-08.
291. H. R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-15, reprinted in [19781 U.S.
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1000, 1001 reveals the following accord:
Conference agreement.
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the conference intended to overrule McMann on the basis of the
majority decision.22 Unfortunately, the language approved by
both Houses cannot reach the basis of the majority decision in
McMann, although it clearly overrules Justice White's and Justice Stewart's concurring opinions. The majority in McMann relied upon a theory of vesting of interest, in short, a "grandfather
clause" argument.2 3 This argument can be raised against the
present amendment which speaks to present and future events,
rather than to plans predating its 1978 adoption. There are, of
course, constitutional problems associated with the appropriation
of "vested" interests in maintaining involuntary retirement pro29
grams.

Consequently, the Supreme Court, if called upon to con-

strue the present amendment to section 4(f)(2), may conclude
this amendment cannot constitutionally reach involuntary retirement programs for persons under age 70 which predate April
8, 1978.
The bona fides of any retirement program remain a live judicial issue. Observing the terms of a bona fide retirement or seniority system may penalize persons within the protected age group
in many ways other than forced early retirement. It is theoretically possible to discriminate against persons between the ages of
40 and 70 by authorizing much less comprehensive retirement
programs for persons hired between those ages, and to discriminate against older workers in profit-sharing, stock options, bonus
plans and the like, without forcing them to accept involuntary
retirement. A system of discrimination in employee benefits, coupled with an attractive "voluntary" retirement package could
House recedes to the Senate amendment. The conferees agree that the purpose
of the amendment to section 4(0(2) is to make absolutely clear one of the
original purposes of this provision, namely, that the exception does not authorize an employer to require or permit involuntary retirement of an employee
within the protected age group on account of age.
In McMann v. United Airlines, 98 S.Ct. 244 (1977) the Supreme Court held
to the contrary, reversing a decision reached by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, 542 F.2d 217 (1976). The conferees specifically disagree with the Supreme Court's holding and reasoning in that case. Plan provisions in effect prior
to the date of enactment are not exempt under section 4(0(2) by virtue of the
fact that they antedate the act or these amendments.
292. Id.
293. 434 U.S. at 196-97.
294. Although the "impairment of contract rights" argument carries little weight
among modem constitutional law scholars, this argument, rather than the textual interpretation of ADEA's section 4(0 and its legislative history supports Chief Justice Burger's
statement that the provisions of section 4(f) are not ambiguous. The pre-1967 retirement
plans have "vested rights" because the Constitution forbids impairment of contract
rights; thus, involuntary retirement at the company's election in pre-1967 pension programs, being a "contract right," may not be abrogated by the ADEA.
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encourage workers, particularly non-management white collar
workers, to choose "voluntary" retirement at ages 55 or 60, thus
avoiding the humiliation of lower fringe benefits and lower job
rating and benefits after 55.
Congress has done about all it can to override the McMann
decision by legislative means. It is now up to the federal judiciary
to decide whether to defer to legislative interpretation and limit
McMann to its facts, rather than elevate the case to the
"impairment of contract" doctrine of constitutional law.
3. The "Notice is Jurisdictional"Defense. Congress also
amended section 7 of the ADEA by adding a new subsection (d)
relating to the system by which an action is initiated:
(d) No civil action may be commenced by an individual under
this section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Secretary. Such a charge
shall be filed(1) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice
occurred; or
(2) in a case to which section 14(b) applies, within 300
days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, or within
30 days after receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings under State law, whichever is earlier.
Upon receiving such a charge, the Secretary shall promptly notify
all persons named in such charge as prospective defendants in the
action and shall promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful
practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference and
persuasion.295

According to the conference committee report:
This change in language is not intended to alter the basic
purpose of the notice requirement, which is to provide the Department with sufficient information . . . to eliminate alleged

unlawful practices through informal methods of conciliation.
Therefore, the conferees intend that the "charge" requirement
will be satisfied by the filing of a written statement which identifies the potential defendant ...
The conferees agree that the "charge" requirement is not a
jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining an action under the
ADEA and that therefore equitable modifications for failing to
file within the time period will be available to plaintiffs under
this act.2'
295. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d) (West Supp. 1978).
296. H. R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-15, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1000, 1006.
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The conference committee report cites several appellate decisions
establishing equitable grounds for relief from the "notice is jurisdictional" defense to liability. The former section 7(d) notice requirement was waived in Dartt v. Shell Oil Co.," for example,
because the defendant had misled the Labor Department enforcement officer and thus Mrs. Dartt, that conciliation was appropriate, without informing Mrs. Dartt that her right to sue depended
upon filing appropriate notice within 180 days after termination."9s In Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc.,' the plaintiff
failed to commence a state process against his employer within
the 90 day limit specified by Pennsylvania law, and thus did not
comply with section 14(b) of the Act, nor did the plaintiff file a
federal notice of intent to sue within 180 days of his last working
day, although his last paycheck had been received less than 180
days prior to filing a federal notice of intent to sue. 0 The district
court dismissed the suit, but the Third Circuit allowed the plaintiff to prove his case, reversing the trial court on the theory that
the defendant had not been harmed by not receiving notice of
intent to sue, nor had federal conciliation been deterred by the
late notice. 0' Charlierv. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., m excused the
plaintiff's late notice of intent to sue because the defendant failed
to post the notice of rights required by section 8 of the Act. 303
Similar equitable exceptions to the strict notice doctrine of section 7 of the ADEA had been made in a number of district court
cases as well.30 ' Although the amendment clarifies congressional
intent and overrules cases that failed to make equitable exceptions to the "notice is jurisdictional" doctrine, it does not relieve
an injured worker from the condition precedent of filing notice of
intent to sue within 180 days after discharge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 301 before filing a civil action
297. 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 429 U.S. 1089 (1977).
298. Id. at 1258, 1260-61.
299. 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977).
300. Id. at 191.
301. Id. at 194.
302. 556 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1977).
303. Id. at 763.
304. See, e.g., Paxton v. Lanvin-Charles of the Ritz, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Locasio v. Teletype Corp., 74 F.R.D. 108 (N.D. Il. 1977) (notice in class action
need
be confined to representative party only); Sartin v. City of Columbus Util. Comm'n,
421
F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Miss. 1976), aff'd without opinion, 573 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.
1978);
Skoglund v. Singer Co., 403 F. Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975) (failure to post notice
waived
defendant's ability to rely on plaintiff's failure to file notice of intent to sue with
the Labor
Department); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Proc. Cas. 1225 (D.N.M.
1975).
305. By the terms of President Carter's Executive Reorganization Plan No. 1, section
2, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (1978), all enforcement functions of the Wage-Hour Division
and
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within the FLSA statute of limitations.
4. Unremedied Technical Defects in the ADEA. The 1978
amendments did not address a surprising number of well-known
technical defects in the ADEA. First, the dispute raised by Rogers
v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co.," Bertrandv. Orkin Exterminating Co.,m and Sant v. Mack Trucks, Inc.,3 over whether a
violation of the ADEA creates a tort for which all damages reasonably foreseeable, including pain, suffering and mental distress, are otherwise compensible was simply left to the judiciary
to work out. Congress indicated no approval or disapproval of the
varying approaches taken on this crucial issue. Second, Congress
made no attempt to deal with the bona fide occupational qualification defense to liability under the ADEA, although the Senate
draft of the 1978 amendments included a clarifying provision on
this problem. This leaves Houghton v. McDonnell-Douglas
Corp." in conflict with the earlier decisions in Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. 310 and Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc."'
Hodgson held age constituted a bona fide occupational qualification for interstate bus drivers, and allowed the company to limit
hiring to persons under age 35, when a scintilla of evidence justified the conclusion that older drivers have slower reflexes and tire
more easily. 312 Tamiami Trail Tours accepted the argument that
if it were impossible or highly impractical to deal with young and
old workers on an individualized basis, age discrimination based
on a general rule of thumb relative to driver safety and fatigue
would be lawful.3 13 Houghton, on the other hand, dealing with the

safety and health requirements for aviation test pilots, concluded
that the burden of proof lay with the defendant to establish a
bona fide occupational qualification defense by a preponderance
of the evidence, without the crutches used in Greyhound Lines
and Tamiami Trail Tours.311 In short, Houghton required that a

the Secretary of Labor have been transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.
306. 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated, 550 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
307. 419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. 111.1976).
308. 424 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
309. 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977).
310. 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
311. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
312. 499 F.2d at 865.
313. 531 F.2d at 238.

314. The district court had made two findings which accorded with Greyhound Lines
and Tamiami Trail Tours:
(1) That functional age, as distinguished from chronological age, cannot be

19781

Age Discrimination

defendant using the bona fide occupational qualification defense
make an affirmative showing that the particular individual who
was retired or dismissed on account of age was actually barred by
reason of his personal aging process from performing his work.115
Congress, by refusing to redefine the bona fide occupational qualification defense, permits this dichotomy to stand without rectification.
Third, the 1978 amendments have not resolved the confusion
created by judicial construction of the provisions of section 14(b)
of the ADEA, which preclude federal suit until 60 days after any
state anti-age discrimination enforcement agency having jurisdiction has received notice of intent to sue. As of this writing, the
judicial custom has been to classify each state into "deferral" or
"non-deferral" status, depending upon the type of
anti-age discrimination law the state has on its books.31 6 In some jurisdictions, the same district court, sitting in a different division, has
made contradictory interpretations of state anti-age discrimination laws requiring deferral in one case, and not another." 7 If
determined with sufficient reliability to meet the special safety demands which
are imposed on McDonnell-Douglas;
(2) In the absence of a comprehensive test by which an individual's functional
age might be determined, there is no alternative to establishing an arbitrary age
limit.
413 F. Supp. at 1236.
315. 553 F.2d at 656.
316. See, e.g., Evans v. Oscar Mayer & Co., 17 Empl. Prac. Guide 6246 (8th Cir. 1978)
(Iowa is a deferral state); Lugo Garces v. Sanger Int'l Corp., 534 F.2d 987 (lst Cir. 1978)
(Puerto Rico is a non-deferral jurisdiction, having no administrative agency charged with
enforcement of age discrimination laws); Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419
F.
Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (Illinois is a non-deferral state because no agency enforces state
anti-age discrimination act).
317. Consider the plight of lawyers in the Eastern District of Michigan. In Nickell v.
Shatterproof Glass Corp., 424 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Mich. 1976), one district judge held that
failure to file notice with the Michigan Human Rights Commission within the prescribed
90 day period after dismissal did not bar a federal ADEA lawsuit. This decision conflicted
with earlier decisions by the same district, which held that filing a complaint with the
Human Rights Commission was a condition precedent to an ADEA action in federal court.
Magalotti v. Ford Motor Co., 418 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Gabriele v. Chrysler
Corp., 416 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Vaghn v. Chrysler Corp., 382 F. Supp. 143
(E.D. Mich. 1974).
Much the same confusion has existed throughout the Third Circuit for the past five
years. In 1974, Goger v. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13 (3rd Cir. 1974) held that failure
to
file a complaint before the relevant New Jersey agency responsible for enforcing state antiage discrimination laws was a bar to suit unless relieved by some equity. This was followed
in Sutherland v. SKF Industries, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1976) which upon
equitable grounds, however, excused the plaintiff's failure to file a complaint with
the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission within 90 days after discharge for age discrimination. Smith v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 419 F. Supp. 770 (D.N.J. 1976) adhered
to this condition precedent doctrine. It is not clear whether the court in McCracken
v.
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deferral to a state anti-age discrimination enforcement agency is
required as condition precedent to bringing a federal ADEA
claim, then a suit may be dismissed for failure to follow state
administrative procedures; if deferral is not a condition precedent, it is simply the aggrieved party's option to choose state procedure over federal procedure, and no bar to suit. This last result
seems to be the only fair result, but the ambiguities of section
14(b) allow judges to reach opposite conclusions about deferral to
state agencies.
Fourth, Congress failed to rectify the confusion surrounding
ADEA class action suits created by conflicting lower court holdings on the applicability of section 16 of the FLSA to class actions.3 8 If section 16 applies to ADEA suits, no person may be a
party plaintiff unless he or she consents to inclusion in the suit,
in contradistinction to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires constitutionally effective
notice to parties and gives class plaintiffs the option to self-select
out of the suit.3 19 Worse still, some courts have insisted that no
person can be a class plaintiff in an ADEA action unless that
person has filed a notice of intent to sue within 180 days of dismissal322 If Congress expects private individuals to be the priShenango, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 1163 (W.D. Pa. 1977) adhered to Goger, or adopted a rule
which waived filing with the state as condition precedent to suit. But in Marshall v.
Chamberlain Mfg. Corp., 443 F. Supp. 159 (M.D. Pa. 1977), the court held that the
Secretary of Labor had to defer to State Human Relations Commission conciliation before
filing suit on behalf of aggrieved workers. This holding clearly went beyond Goger's rule.
Finally, in Holliday v. Ketcham, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6313 (3rd
Cir. 1978), the Third Circuit reversed Goger and concluded that filing a complaint with
state agencies was an alternative to federal litigation, and not condition precedent to suit.
Since Goger is the leading case courts outside the Third Circuit have relied on in adopting
the condition precedent doctrine, its reversal may end the silly results reached in the
Eastern District of Michigan.
318. See Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3rd Cir. 1978) (ADEA class action
governed by FED. R. Civ. P. not by section 16 of FLSA); Pandis v. Sikorksy Aircraft Div.
of U.T.C., 431 F. Supp. 793 (D. Conn. 1977). (notice by representative of class to Labor
Department sufficient compliance with section 7(d) ADEA to permit class action).
Accord, Locasio v. Teletype Corp., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 471 (N.D. Il. 1977); Cavanaugh v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 463 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Murphy
v. American Motors Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403 (N.D. Ga. 1976). But see Wagner v.
Leow's Theatres, Inc. 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 334 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (all members of class
must consent to suit and give notice to Labor Department to maintain class suit); Naton
v. Bank of California, 72 F.R.D. 550 (N.D. Cal. 1976); LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,
64 F.R.D. 96 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Gebhare v. GAF Corp., 59 F.R.D. 504 (D.D.C. 1973).
319. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 provides that notice to parties constituting the representative
class shall be made by order of the court so as to ensure each party a reasonable opportunity to opt out of the class action.
320. Hayes v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976); Gebhard v. GAF
Corp., 59 F.R.D. 504 (D.D.C. 1973). But see Burgette v. Cudahy Co., 361 F. Supp. 617
(D. Kan. 1973) which reached an opposite, and the correct conclusion.
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mary means of enforcement of the ADEA by relevant civil process, Congress should ensure that ADEA class actions against
corporate offenders are easily maintainable and readily accessible
to injured parties, even though some injured parties have not
complied with the "notice as condition precedent to suit" doctrine for an individual civil action. By its silence on the class
action issue, Congress allows the judiciary to dismiss class actions
in ADEA enforcement proceedings as if they were wage-hour
claims for unpaid minimum wages.
Fifth, Congress has not really clarified the relationship between the ADEA and other civil rights legislation. It still is not
at all clear whether upon proof of a prima facie case, the plaintiff
in an ADEA case shifts the burdens of production and proof to
the defendant,3 11 as in a typical Title V or Title VII Civil Rights
Act suit. Circuit court cases go both ways. The Fifth Circuit has
followed the normal Title VII approach to this issue, and requires
the defendant to carry the burden of persuasion after the plaintiff
has made out a prima facie case.32 The Sixth Circuit adopted a
different, somewhat more plaintiff-oriented rule in Laugesen v.
Anaconda Co., 32 which stated that a verdict could not be directed
for the defendant in an ADEA suit if there was any scintilla of
evidence that age was a factor in dismissal or retirement.3 2' The
remaining circuits have not dealt with this issue. As a result, the
presumption must be that outside the Fifth and Sixth Circuits,
an ADEA case is an ordinary civil suit, in which the plaintiff
maintains the burden of proof during the entire trial. If a plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case, the defendant may prevail by simply proposing some evidence, however slender, to contradict the
plaintiff's case. The usual civil action rule is very defendantoriented, and thus leads easily to directed verdicts for the defendant. Congress again has left this crucial area to the courts to use
as a football to get rid of cases whenever possible.
To summarize, then: the 1978 ADEA amendments attempted to cure three of seven major technical defects in the Act,
two of which are major constitutional issues. Regarding jury trial
rights, Congress has informed the courts that it intends the full
range of seventh amendment jury trial rights to extend to ADEA
litigants. Congress also instructed the courts, particularly the
Supreme Court, that there were to be no legislatively-induced
321.
322.
323.
324.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Wilson v. Sealtest Food Div. of Kraftco Corps., 501 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1974).
510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 317.
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"grandfather clauses" in section 4(f) of the ADEA for pre-1968
retirement programs. How far Congress can go to override the
Supreme Court's McMann decision, however, remains unclear.
Finally, Congress did clarify the "notice is jurisdictional" defense
by requiring the courts to allow equitable exceptions to the usual
rule that a prospective ADEA litigant must notify the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days after dismissal of his or her intention to sue a former employer. These
technical changes were minimal. Congress did not deal with
whether the ADEA created a new tort, whether the bona fide
occupational qualification defense could be maintained without
showing an individual was personally unable by reason of his or
her own aging process to continue to work, or whether an ADEA
class action is subject to the restrictive class action provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act. In fact, Congress also has yet to
identify what constitutes a cause of action or the elements of a
justifiable claim under the ADEA, and who has the burden of
proof on the material issues alleged in an ADEA complaint.
The Substantive Changes in the ADEA
Congress did alter the substantive structure of the ADEA in
two highly significant ways. First, Congress raised the mandatory
retirement limit for non-federal employees from age 65 to 70.
Second, Congress abolished mandatory retirement for federal
employees. Both substantive changes clearly will alter the character of American life, and may reverse the present trend to an
increased dependency ratio in this nation. In short, both changes
reflect a congressional intention to increase productivity in the
American labor force.
1. Raising Mandatory Retirement to Age 70. Technically,
Congress eliminated the ancient limit of mandatory retirement at
age 65 by amending section 12(a) of the ADEA to provide that
"the prohibitions in this Act shall be limited to individuals who
C.

' '3
are at least 40 years of age but less than 70 years of age. 2 This

general elimination of Bismarck's Prussian social security and
retirement age from American law, however, is subject to two
qualifications, both thoroughly discussed in committee and on
the floor of both Houses. The first denies the benefits of the new
upper age limit to highly compensated corporate employees:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit compulsory retirement of any employee who has attained 65 years of age
325. 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(a) (West Supp. 1978).
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but not 70 years of age, and who, for the 2-year period immediately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide executive or
a high policymaking position, if such employee is entitled to an
immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit from a pension, profit-sharing, savings, or deferred compensation plan, or
any combination of such plans, of the employer of such employee, which equals, in the aggregate, at least $27,000.32s
The style and flavor of this proviso is that of Internal Revenue
Code draft-personship. The congressional purpose in adding this
proviso, according to the Senate Report on the Senate Amendment, was to permit employers to replace key executives to provide promotional opportunities for younger executives in business. This proviso was the brain child of Senator Claiborne Pell
of Rhode Island, 327 who further explained his position during floor
debate:
In my view, an exemption for high level executives is wise and
necessary. Large corporations depend upon a regular and predictable turnover in high level personnel to assure themselves of
a constant replenishment of new ideas and perspectives at the
topmost levels of corporate decision making.
An automatic retirement age for top level personnel is recognized and widely used as an effective and proven element in
this transmission process. The executive exemption contained
in this bill permits this automatic retirement policy, beginning
no lower than age 65, to remain in effect.
• . . Estimates I have received from large corporations indicate that each age 65 high level management retirement creates
between five and eight middle level management promotions.
These promotions are necessary to keep good, talented personnel with a large corporation.
A logjam in executive retirement also harms the affirmative
3
action plans which these corporations have placed in effect. 2
Senator Pell claimed the proviso affected less than .4% of all
corporate management retirements, and imposed no substantial
economic hardship on individual top managers affected by the
proviso. 2 9 Whether this exception is socially useful is fairly debatable, but it does little harm to the impact of the 1978 amendments.
326. Id. § 631(c).
327. S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 11978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 982.
328. 123 CONG. REc. S17,289 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Pell).
329. Id. at S17,289-90. Pell claimed only 464 out of 11,000 executives would be affected by this proviso. There seems to be very little social utility behind this exception,
except the placating of an interest group that could block passage of the bill itself.
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The second proviso, however, strikes more deeply into the
ranks of middle-class America. Congress also extended the status
quo for college, university, and professional school educators until
1982. As originally drafted, college, university, and professional
school educators as well as grade and secondary school teachers
would be "grandfathered" into mandatory retirement at age 65
indefinitely. 30 The review of this proviso in conference committee
produced abolition of the proviso applying to elementary and
secondary teachers, and a limitation on the mandatory retirement restriction on collegiate faculty to a period expiring in
1982.33 In floor debate both provisos were challenged as arbitrary
and unreasonable, and therefore contrary to the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.332 The original version of H.R.
5383 contained neither proviso.s
The best that can be said for the tenured faculty proviso is
that it permitted the passage of the 1978 ADEA amendments. It
lacks even a fairly debatable rational purpose and is an arbitrary,
unreasonable, and totally capricious classification. The same
may be said for the business executive proviso. Ostensibly, each
proviso was to ensure the promotion of younger men and women
within bureaucratic organizations. 33 No advocates of either mea330. S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 119781 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 984. 123 CONG. REC. S17,272 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) contained the original
version of the Senate amendment, reading as follows:
(c) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit compulsory retirement
of employees who have attained 65 years of age but not 70 years of age, and who
are serving under a contract of unlimited tenure (or similar arrangement providing for unlimited tenure) at an institution of higher learning as defined by
section 1201(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965.
(d) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit compulsory retirement
of teachers who have attained 65 years of age but not 70 years of age, and who
are serving under a contract of unlimited tenure in a local education agency as
defined by section 801(f) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965, of a State, if State law in effect at the date of enactment of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1977 provides for such retirement.
331. 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(d) (West Supp. 1978).
332. 123 CONG. REc. S17,284 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Church), and
S17,285-86 (reprint of New York Times article, "The Senate and Ageism," of October 9,
1977).
333. Id. at H9967-68 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1977).
334. Id. at S17,283, S17,287, S17,290 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Senators
Hayakawa, Chafee, Moynihan). The principal reason these Senators supported the proviso had to do with the "threat" to higher education imposed by retaining senior tenured
faculty after 65. Sen. Moynihan, in summing up the affirmative said:
American colleges and universities underwent a great expansion in the
course of the 1950's and 1960's, they hired a large number of faculty members
who acquired tenure and who are now on the verge of retirement.
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sure offered statistical confirmation of this objective, although
Senator Pell produced a chart showing the low impact of the key
executives proviso. 35 If the provisos are accorded the kind of strict
scrutiny testing which all offensive classifications in terms of
race, national origin, sex or religion are generally given by courts,
they will probably be held unconstitutional.
2. Removing the Age Ceiling for FederalEmployees. Representative Pepper has been waging a one-person campaign to abrogate the concept of mandatory retirement for at least a decade.
During House debate on the 1978 ADEA amendments, Representative Pepper expressed strong approval of the experimental
lifting of mandatory retirement for federal employees.3 The purpose behind the amendment to section 15 of the ADEA is precisely to experiment, with one considerable block of employees,
with the abolition of mandatory retirement. This may be justifiable as an experimental measure, because it is tied to the Secretary of Labor's duty to report within 2 years both on the effectiveness of the 1978 amendments,37 and/or the feasibility of total
abolition of mandatory retirement.
To curb the present high cost of social security contributions,
Congress has elected to limit the growing dependency ratio by
encouraging older workers to remain at work. In the case of federal workers, whose retirement age had been 70 for a number of
years, this provides an opportunity to develop data on the impact
Their prospect of retiring comes at a time when there is very little prospect
for an increase in university and college enrollment, such that there is no increase in the demand for teachers at them, such that to an extraordinary degree,
few new faculty are going to be hired as old faculty retire.
During this period, we are going to be awarding some 35,000 doctoral degrees each year. During that period the 3,000 colleges and universities in the
country are expected to hire some 3,700 faculty members. In round terms, one
Ph.D. in nine can expect a position in a university. In round terms, each university or college will be adding one tenured member a year to its faculty.
The system of tenure which evolved in American universities evolved not
as a retirement policy but as a system of doing two things: one, protecting
faculty against the changing political and intellectual fashions of the time, and,
two, insuring sufficient periods in which work requiring a long gestation could
be done. It is an intellectual policy. It is an academic policy. It has to do with
creativity and productivity and scholarship.
Id. at S17,290 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Moynihan).
335. See note 329 supra.
336. Rep. Pepper estimated that raising the mandatory retirement age to 70 would
relieve the social security system of between $600,000,000 and $700,000,000 each year in
benefits presently paid out. 123 CONG. REc. H9352 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1977).
337. 29 U.S.C.A. § 624(a)(1) (West Supp. 1978).
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of self-selected retirement as the primary means of ending a working career. If the data produced by one or two years operation of
this system should disclose a significant working constituency
after age 70 in the federal service, then some meaningful data
about the economic impact of ending mandatory retirement can
be generated. The suggestion is that mandatory retirement really
helps no particular special interest group, nor serves any rational
social need.
V.

CONCLUSION

Congress did not attempt to revise thoroughly the administrative and judicial mechanics of the ADEA in its 1978 amendments. It was much more interested in experimenting with raising
the age for, or abolishing entirely, mandatory retirement. As a
result, the creaking enforcement machinery of the original ADEA
must be endured for another season. Whether transferring ADEA
enforcement from the Wage-Hour Division to the EEOC will
mean anything in terms of increased effectiveness in conciliation
and mediation of age discrimination cases remains to be seen.
The cumbersome deferral to state agencies and the equally cumbersome dual system of toothless agency conciliation followed by
"private attorney general" ADEA litigation will endure for at
least another Congress.
Congress, meanwhile, dealt a potential deathblow to the concept of mandatory retirement by exempting most federal employees from any enforced retirement on account of age. This may
provide useful data to Congress in considering whether to extend
this freedom to work to all older American workers. Because no
human or economic justification for mandatory retirement at age
65 or at age 70 exists, Congress may be willing to permit the
concept of agism in employment to die a well-deserved death.
Congressional concessions, however, to hysterical special interest
groups, who feared upsetting the status quo by raising the retirement age for executives and college teachers to 70, produced two
provisos to section 12 of the ADEA which are probably arbitrary
and unreasonable, and therefore beyond the allowable scope of
legislative discretion. Although the proviso for key executives affects only a small number of highly paid persons, the college
teacher proviso hits hard at a substantial group of older Americans without retirement packages of substantial size. The only
saving grace is the expiration of the college professor proviso in
1982.
Age discrimination in employment and in American life will
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not be solved overnight by congressional fiat. To effect significant
changes in the behavior of American employers, which behavior
has not changed much since the adoption of the original 1967
ADEA, some responsible party must execute the congressional
intent by vigorous enforcement of the ADEA. 5 The latest buckpassing operation which relegates ADEA enforcement to the
hotchpot of the EEOC probably will mean that the overworked,
underpaid EEOC staff will be forced to choose between enforcement of Titles V through IX of the Civil Rights Act and the
ADEA. The chances are that without additional manpower and
appropriations for ADEA enforcement, the Act will receive worse
treatment in EEOC hands than it did at the hands of the WageHour Division. Age discrimination in employment is too widespread an American evil to dismiss as an adjunct of some other
program's funding. It deserves legislative support by means of an
efficient enforcement program modeled after known, efficient
administrative processes.
338. For a different enforcement scheme modeled after the NLRB and other single
member adjudicative systems conforming to the Administrative Procedure Act, see Reed,
supra note 162, at 796-98.

